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BRIEF OF APPELLEES/CROSS-APPELLANTS 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j)(1996). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
In its prior opinion in this case, this Court left several issues unresolved other than 
the rescission issue which is the primary focus of Defendant Doms' brief. See Anderson 
v. Doms. Case No. 920653CA, Slip op. 3 n.2 (Utah App. 1994). Therefore, on their 
cross-appeal, Plaintiffs/Appellees/Cross-appellants, Ellen Anderson, et al. (hereinafter 
Anderson" or "Plaintiffs") present the following issues for review: 
1. Was Doms not entitled to damages because he did not own the entire property? 
Standard of Review: This issue involves a conclusion of law made by the trial court. A 
trial court's conclusions and legal interpretations are afforded no deference and are 
reviewed for correctness. State v. Humphrey. 823 P.2d 464, 465, (Utah 1991). This 
issue was preserved for appellate review in this Court's prior opinion in this case. 
Anderson v. Doms. Case No. 920653 CA slip op. at 3n. 2. (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
2. Did Doms' election of rescission preclude a subsequent trial on damages? 
Standard of Review: This issue involves a conclusion of law. A trial court's conclusions 
and legal interpretations are afforded no deference and are reviewed for correctness. 
Scharfv. BMGCorp.. 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985). This issue was preserved for 
review when plaintiffs requested that the trial court order Doms to elect the remedy he 
1 
chose to pursue. (R. 4124-39). 
3. Did the trial court deprive plaintiffs Anderson and Scott of benefits to which they were 
entitled under the trust deed note? 
Standard of Review: This issue involves a conclusion of law which is afforded no 
deference and is reviewed for correctness. State v. Humphrey. 823 P.2d 464,465, (Utah 
1991). This issue was preserved for review during the trial on the issue of damages. 
(Addendum 2). 
4. Did the trial court improperly offset Doms' damages against those owed to plaintiffs ? 
Standard of Review: A trial court's conclusions of law and legal interpretations are 
afforded no deference and are reviewed for correctness. Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 
1068, 1070 (Utah 1985). This issue was preserved for review in plaintiffs objections to 
the trial court's proposed conclusions. (R. 6919). 
5. Did the court err in concluding that the statute of limitations did not bar Doms' 
counterclaim? 
Standard of Review: This issue involves a conclusion of law which is afforded no 
deference by a reviewing court and is reviewed for correctness. Scharf v. BMG Corp.. 
700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985). This issue was preserved for review in plaintiffs 
memorandum in support of their motion for summary judgment (R. 3422-25). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The text of any constitutional provisions, statutes or rules relevant to this case is 
contained in the text or the addenda. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
When defendants Doms and McCoy failed to make payments required by a trust 
deed note secured by property known as Rossi Hills in Summit County, plaintiffs Scott and 
the Estate of D. C. Anderson filed an action to foreclose the trust deed as a mortgage. (R. 
1-9) A default judgment was entered against both defendants on January 21, 1988. (R.34-
40) Four months later, on April 22, 1988, defendant Doms moved the court to set aside 
the judgment. (R. 49-52) The court granted Doms1 motion and on June 20, 1988, entered 
an order setting aside the judgment with respect to Doms.1 (R. 126,7) 
Before the motion to set aside the default judgment had been filed, Doms filed an 
answer and counterclaim on January 29, 1988. (R. 41) However, to comply with the 
conditions for removal of the default judgment, Doms had to file a certificate of 
compliance which stated that the answer and counterclaim were not "officially accepted" 
by the trial court until June 1, 1988. (R. 76-78) On June 15, 1988, Doms filed an 
amended counterclaim, asserting only a claim for rescission. (R. 102-05) A seconded 
amended counterclaim contained causes of action for rescission, lost profits and fraud.2 
1
 On October 21, 1988, the court issued an order of sale directing the sale of 
McCoy's interest. After timely notice and publication, McCoy's one-half interest was 
sold on December 12, 1988. After a hearing, an amended deficiency judgment was 
entered against McCoy on January 24, 1991. (R. 5146-7) McCoy did not contest the 
default judgment or the deficiency judgment and is not a party to any appeal. 
2
 Significantly, Doms1 second amended counterclaim did not seek damages for 
breach of the covenants contained in the deed but referred to the alleged breach only as 
a ground for rescission. 
3 
(R. 237) 
Following motions for dismissal and summary judgment, all of which were denied, 
plaintiffs demanded that Doms elect his remedy. Thereafter, at the commencement of the 
trial on April 17, 1990, and during the trial, the motion was renewed and Doms elected 
to proceed on rescission. (R. 7087, 7759) On April 30, 1990, Judge Rokich issued a 
memorandum decision in which he held that rescission was not available to Doms. (R. 
4244 et seq.) Over the objection of plaintiffs, the trial court reconvened for the purpose 
of determining if a violation of the covenant against encumbrances existed and, if one was 
found, deterrruning damages even though Doms had not pleaded the contract action. (R. 
7753 et seq.) The bench trial was held on August 21, 1990. On October 4, 1990, the 
court issued the first of five memorandum decisions involving the contract claims. (R. 
4348 et seq.) Finally, on June 23, 1992, the court issued its final Second Amended 
Findings and Conclusions and Second Amended Judgment. (R. 6874 et seq.; Addendum 
2) . Final judgment was entered on June 23, 1992. (R. 6900-6907) 
Both parties appealed the trial court's judgment. On November 4, 1994, the court 
of appeals issued a memorandum decision resolving many of the issues raised on appeal. 
Anderson v. Doms. Case No. 920653CA (Utah Ct. App. filed Nov. 4,1994) (Addendum 
1.) The court did not resolve all the issues however and remanded the case "for the 
purpose of entering findings of fact relevant to whether appellants were prejudiced by any 
delays in Doms pursuing his counterclaim. If the trial court cannot find from the evidence 
presented that the appellants were prejudiced by the delay, the equitable doctrine of laches 
4 
should not bar the remedy of rescission." Anderson, slip op. at 3 (Addendum 1). 
However, the court also noted that if the trial court did not rescind the transaction, the 
trial court's 
findings and conclusions do not adequately treat the effect of the intervening 
conveyances to and from Domcoy on Doms's right to pursue his 
counterclaims and the effect of the default judgment entered against McCoy 
and the sheriffs sale of McCoy's interest in Rossi Hills on Doms's 
ownership interest in the property and any damages for breach of the title 
warranties. 
Anderson, Slip op. at 3 n.2. In other words, if the trial court did not find rescission, it 
was required to reexamine and support its conclusions on a variety of issues some of which 
concerned whether Doms, in fact, properly held title to the property.3 
On remand, the trial court received filings from both sides and held a hearing to 
resolve the outstanding issues. It then issued findings and conclusions on May 31, 1996, 
which denied Doms's claim for rescission. (R. 8335; AddendumlO) The court then entered 
an order on Sept. 8,1997, which concluded that Doms held clear title to the property. (R. 
8533-36; Addendum 11) Both parties again appealed the trial court's rulings. 
FACTS 
This case involves undeveloped property, known as Rossi Hills, in Summit County. 
It was owned by plaintiffs Scott and Anderson as tenants in common. (Exhibit 27)4 
3
 Doms does not acknowledge this portion of the court's opinion in his brief. 
4
 All exhibits referred to in this brief were admitted at trial. Exhibit lists are 
contained in R7081-82 and R437-38. 
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Eugene Doms, through real estate agent Michael Sloan, made offers on behalf of 
himself and Michael R. McCoy to purchase Rossi Hills. (Exhibit 63) The sale was 
consummated and a deed was executed by Dan Scott and his wife, Jeanne Scott, and D. 
C. Anderson and his wife, Ellen Anderson, as grantors, in favor of Doms and McCoy, as 
grantees, each with an undivided one-half interest. (Exhibit 1) On the March 10, 1982, 
Doms and McCoy executed a trust deed note in the amount of $194,250.00 in favor of "D. 
C. Anderson as to an undivided one-half interest, and Dan Scott as to an undivided 
one-half interest." (Exhibit 3) The note was secured by a trust deed executed by Doms 
and McCoy on the same date in favor of Scott and Anderson. (Exhibit 2) 
Michael Sloan, a real estate agent, testified that he and Doms walked the property 
in advance of the sale and observed the loop road and the other features later claimed to 
be undisclosed encumbrances. (R.6883) Sloan testified that all claimed encroachments 
were plainly visible. (R. 7653, 7658, 7661, 7662, 7663, 7664, 7667, 7686) 
On October 30, 1981, five months before their purchase of Rossi Hills, Doms and 
McCoy created a corporation called Domcoy Enterprises, Inc. (Exhibit 31) The 
corporation held annual meetings for the years 1983 (Exhibit 35), 1984 (Exhibit 36), 1985 
(Exhibit 37). Doms and McCoy, through Domcoy, conducted a substantial amount of real 
estate business in of Utah as indicated by their attorney. (R. 7539-41; 7560) 
On August 30, 1983, Doms and McCoy conveyed Rossi Hills to Domcoy 
Enterprises. (Exhibit 16) Shortly thereafter, Domcoy developed a joint venture 
agreement for the development of Rossi Hills and other adjacent properties. (Exhibits 81, 
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82) From 1982 Domcoy failed to pay the real estate taxes on the Rossi Hills property, 
and a tax sale was conducted. (Exhibit 5 to the Complaint in consolidated case #10066.) 
Doms, McCoy and Domcoy failed to make payments required by the trust deed note under 
the note which precipitated the foreclosure action. (Exhibit 6) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
In response to this Court, the trial court issued extensive findings and 
conclusions to support its ruling that rescission was not available to Doms. Plaintiffs assert 
that Doms has not marshaled the evidence on appeal to demonstrate the court's findings 
are clearly erroneous. Rescission was unavailable to Doms because he did not own and, 
therefore, could not tender the property. Doms waived his right to rescission by failing 
to promptly request it. Plaintiffs contend that the trial court's findings demonstrate that 
Doms had no basis for rescission and that they were prejudiced by Doms' delay in 
requesting it and that the parties cannot be returned to their original positions. 
Plaintiffs next argue that the trial court correctly denied Doms' request for attorney 
fees. The trial court properly determined that Doms was not the prevailing party. Doms' 
other claims surrounding attorney fees, therefore, also fail. 
The trial court's award of attorneys fees was correct. As the prevailing party, 
plaintiffs were clearly entitled to the fees, but that amount should be augmented. 
On their cross-appeal, plaintiffs raise a number of issues left either unresolved by 
this Court's prior opinion or not addressed by that opinion, and one issue which should be 
re-examined. Plaintiffs assert that intervening conveyances subsequent to the conveyance 
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to Doms and McCoy demonstrate that Doms was not entitled to damages because he owned, 
at most, one-half of the property. Doms' election of rescission as his remedy should have 
foreclosed the subsequent trial on damages. Plaintiffs are entitled to the benefit provided 
in the trust deed which should not have ben modified by the court. The court should not 
have offset the damages against plaintiffs against the balance owed by Doms because this 
changed the terms of the contract. Finally, an over-arching issue - whether the trial court 
was correct in its conclusions concerning the statute of limitations - should be re-examined. 
If, as plaintiffs contend, the trial court was wrong in its conclusions concerning the statute 
of limitations, the unique facts of mis case require that Doms' action be dismissed. This 
conclusion should have been reached by the trial court. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
(Response to Doms' Point I) 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT RESCISSION WAS NOT 
AVAILABLE TO DOMS. 
In the initial appeal, the court of appeals noted that the trial court had made findings 
concerning Doms' delay in bringing the action for rescission, but stated that the trial court 
made no findings as to whether Plaintiffs were prejudiced by the delay. Anderson. Slip op. 
at 2. On this basis, this Court remanded the case for the purpose of entering findings on 
whether plaintiffs were prejudiced by Doms' delays in pursuing rescission. Id. 
On remand, the trial court made extensive findings regarding rescission, not only on 
the issues of prejudice, but on all facets of the issue of rescission. (R. 8535-52; Addendum 
8 
10). The supplemental findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding the issue of 
rescission deal extensively with the rescission issue. However, in his brief, Doms attacks 
the findings of fact as insufficient and irrelevant. Brief of Appellant at 19-30. Because of 
this, Doms, while claiming to be aware of his burden to marshal the evidence to challenge 
findings of fact, states that because in his view, the findings are inadequate, he should 
automatically be granted rescission.5 Doms' assertion, made with no legal support, is 
wrong for a variety of reasons. First, Doms has ignored the correct standard of review, 
Doms has also ignored relevant findings made by the court which demonstrate the lack of 
any basis for rescission, Doms has identified the wrong remedy even if the trial court's 
5
 Throughout Doms' brief is an undisguised attack on the fairness of the trial 
court. However, in doing so, Doms repeatedly takes the trial court's statements out of 
context. For example, Doms states that "at the October 27, 1995 hearing on remand, 
the trial court began the proceeding by stating, 'it appears to me from reading (the Utah 
Court of Appeals memorandum) that the issue here is with regard to rescission... I 
thought I made that quite clear that I would not allow the rescission at the time we 
started this case.' " Brief of Appellant at 20. Doms then attempts to make this appear 
that the trial court was prejudiced before the hearing started. In fact, immediately 
following the quotation given by Doms, the following exchange occurred: 
Mr. Biele: You did. 
Mr. Keller: Your Honor, if I may. We are the moving party initially. We filed the 
first motion to implement the court of appeals decision. I would like to have an 
opportunity to explain that to you if you will let me. 
The Court: Yes. I just wanted to know that is the issue. 
(Emphasis added). In other words, what Doms portrays as prejudice on the part of the 
trial court is nothing more than a judicial inquiry regarding the basis for the hearing. 
Interestingly, while Doms attacks the fairness of the trial judge, he did not 
appeal the issue of judicial prejudice which he unsuccessfully raised in the trial court. 
If Doms is claiming judicial prejudice, that should have been raised as a separate issue, 
not disguised as "pot-shots" taken at the trial judge in this forum. 
9 
findings are insufficient, and, finally, Doms has ignored separate, independent bases 
supported by the trial court's findings which preclude rescission. 
A. This Court should not consider the issue of rescission because Doms has not marshaled 
the evidence to demonstrate that the findings are clearly erroneous. 
Doms acknowledges that the correct standard of review for an appellate court is that 
the findings of fact should not be overturned unless they are clearly erroneous. However, 
Doms then states that he will ignore the standard of review on this appeal because, in his 
view, the findings are insufficient. Before discussing prejudice, the trial court made 
important, relevant findings directiy related to the rescission issue which impact that issue. 
In its supplemental findings of fact and conclusions of law, the trial court found, inter alia: 
1. The real estate transaction between the plaintiffs and defendants related 
to the Rossi Hills Property in Summit County, State of Utah, was an arms-
length transaction conducted in good faith and wherein the defendant Doms 
had full knowledge of the encumbrances and, as heretofore found, there was 
no fraud or misrepresentation involved in this sale. 
2. Doms determined that the property value could be enhanced if it was 
developed with two other adjoining parcels and purchased an interest in one 
of the adjoining parcels, Slipper Parcel, so that an integrated development 
could take place, and he proceeded to try to develop the properties even 
though he had no experience in that area. 
3. Doms did not raise the issue of rescission at the time of conveyance from 
him and McCoy to Domcoy Enterprises, Inc. on August 30, 1983, nor did he 
raise the issue of rescission when he requested and obtained a warranty deed 
to the property from Domcoy on August 20, 1988. Doms' actions and 
conduct indicated he wanted to own the subject property despite the 
encroachments and prescriptive easements and did not act to rescind the 
transaction. 
4. The findings of fact heretofore made by this Court found that Doms had 
familiarized himself with the property, knew of the encroachments, the loop 
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road and that the development could be enhanced if developed with two other 
adjoining parcels. Doms proceeded to try and develop the property even 
though he had no experience in developing real estate and was unfamiliar 
with land development in the Park City area. 
5. It was evident to the Court that Doms was motivated by the lure of a 
quick profit and did not take the time or make the effort to make a sound 
economic evaluation for the development of the property. 
(Supplemental Findings of Fact, #1-6; R.8535-52; AddendumlO) Other pertinent findings 
on Doms' rescission claims and the prejudice suffered by Plaintiffs are reproduced below. 
For the most part, Doms1 claims concerning the trial court's ruling on the issue of 
rescission are attacks on the sufficiency of the findings of the trial court. However, some 
of the findings set forth above and others which have not been set out here which form the 
basis for the trial court's conclusions that Doms was barred by his own lack of diligence 
from rescinding the transaction are not even mentioned in Doms' brief. Doms' failure to 
confront these critical findings means that he has also not demonstrated them to be clearly 
erroneous by marshaling the evidence which support them and showing that the evidence 
is insufficient. Doms picks and chooses among findings, attacking their relevancy. 
However, in many instances, even those findings Doms admits are factually correct. 
This Court has stated that failure of an appellant to marshal the supporting evidence 
or presentation of merely contradictory evidence is an adequate basis for affirming the trial 
court. West Valley Citv v. Majestic Inv. Co.. 818 P.2d 1311, 1313 (Utah App. 1991). 
On that basis, this Court should affirm the trial court's ruling on rescission. 
The findings set forth by the court in its Supplemental Findings and Conclusions are 
sufficient. This Court has previously stated that if findings are so inadequate that they 
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cannot be meaningfully challenged as factual determinations, the appellant is relieved of his 
duty to marshal die evidence in an attack on me findings. Woodward v. Fazzio. 823 P.2d 
474, 477 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). The court however then stated that findings in that case 
were inadequate because they provided "no insight into the evidentiary basis for the trial 
court's decision and render appellate review unfeasible." Woodward. 823 P.2d at 478. 
Despite Doms' claims that some of the findings are irrelevant, when the findings are read 
together, they provide insight into the evidentiary basis for the trial court's decision and 
render effective review possible. In many instances Doms does not dispute me validity of 
a finding but merely concludes that it is "irrelevant." Relevancy should be viewed in 
context which Doms refuses to do. Doms' relevancy arguments are therefore misleading. 
For example, Doms states mat finding of fact lOd is unsupported by the record. 
That finding states that Doms waited more than six years before he sought rescission of the 
transaction. Throughout his brief, Doms contends mat his settlement offer in January 1985 
indicated his intent to rescind. However, several problems surround the 1985 date. First, 
Doms cannot point to any written offer to rescind before June 1988. Further, the settlement 
offer which Doms describes was made at a time when Doms had no right, title or interest 
in the real estate. If the offer of setdement could be considered an offer of rescission and 
tender the property, me offer would have to have been made by Domcoy Enterprises, Inc., 
the then-record tide owner. Doms did not make any offer of rescission until after he filed 
his counterclaim in me suit to foreclose a trust deed, and then, he did not own the property 
and could not have made an appropriate tender. The 1988 date for rescission in me 
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findings is supported by Doms' counterclaims. (R237-42) 
In short, Doms' assertion that the findings are inadequate and therefore he should 
not have to marshal the evidence is simply unsupportable when the findings are examined 
as a whole. Domsf failure to marshal the evidence in an attack on the findings should, in 
and of itself, be sufficient basis for this Court to affirm on the issue of rescission. 
B. Even ifDoms' assertions with respect to the findings are correct, he is not entitled to 
rescission, but rather a remand for entry of sufficient findings. 
Doms concludes that if the trial court's findings are insufficient, then he is entitled 
to rescission ordered by this Court. In fact, Doms can cite no case in which this Court has 
ever authorized or ordered such a remedy. When this Court has determined that findings 
were insufficient, it has remanded the case for the entry of sufficient findings. 
For example, in Woodward, this Court remanded the case for more detailed 
findings, after instructing the trial court concerning the content of its findings. Woodward, 
823 P.2d at 479. In In Re Estate of Ouinn v. Ouinn, 830 P.2d 282, 286 (Utah Ct. App. 
1992) this Court stated,w unless the record clearly and uncontrovertedly supports the trial 
court's decision, the absence of adequate findings of fact precludes appellate review of the 
evidentiary basis underlying the trial court's decision and requires remand for a more 
detailed findings by the trial court." In only one instance, has this Court, over a strong 
dissent, stated that remand is unnecessary-when findings on a particular factual issue are 
unnecessary because the evidence concerning the issue is undisputed. Levitz v. 
Warrington, 877 P.2d 1245, 1248 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). However, after this statement 
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appeared in Levitz. the court canvassed the record and found disputed evidence which made 
affirmance as a matter of law impossible. Levitz. 877 P.2d at 1248. The court held 
remand to the trial court for entry of additional findings was required. 
Plaintiffs contend the trial court's findings on rescission are sufficient. However, 
even if Doms is correct and the trial court's findings are insufficient, the proper remedy is 
not reversal, but remand for entry of detailed findings with directions from this Court on 
the content of those findings. Indeed, Doms cites no case in which a Utah court has 
reversed a trial court and ordered entry of a judgment based on inadequate findings 
C. Rescission was not available to Doms because he did not own and therefore, could not 
tender the subject property. 
Doms fails to address a critical issue which was resolved in the trial court's 
supplemental findings and conclusions. That issue concerns the ownership of the parcel. 
At the time Doms filed his pleadings requesting rescission he had no right, title or interest 
in Rossi Hills. Doms and McCoy had originally owned the property as tenants in common 
(R. 8533-36; Addendum 11), but they had transferred their interest in the property to 
Summit County Title Company as trustee (Exhibit 2), and thereafter, they transferred any 
unencumbered interest in the property to Domcoy Enterprises, Inc. by warranty deed, dated 
August 20, 1983. (Exhibit 16; Addendum 11). Subsequently, as a result of Domcoy's 
failure to pay taxes, the property was sold to Summit County on May 27, 1987. 
A contract cannot be rescinded unless the seller and the buyer can be placed in the 
original positions which existed before die contract. 50 West Broadway Assoc, v. 
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Redevelopment Agency, 784 P.2d 1162, 1170 (Utah 1989). In cases involving transfers 
of property, the Utah Supreme Court has stated, "The law is well-settled that one electing 
to rescind a contract must tender back to the other contracting party whatever property of 
value he has received." Perry v. WoodalL 438 P.2d 813, 815 (Utah 1968). 
In this case because Doms had transferred the property before the rescission offer, 
he did not have title and could not tender the property as part of a rescission offer. 
Therefore, the rescission offer itself was a non-sequitur. As an additional complicating 
factor, Doms originally only received an undivided one-half interest in the property and 
McCoy, the other one-half owner, has made no appearance in this case and has not made 
any request for rescission. Further, Doms could not correct any tide deficiency because 
the one-half interest in the property owned by his partner was sold at a sheriff's sale and 
is now not available to Doms, so rescission is not available. (R. 46; 568-9; 1200-03) 
Therefore, a question arises concerning Doms1 ability to rescind one half of a contract. 
In its supplemental findings of fact, the trial court stated: "From August 30, 1983 
through the date of the tax sale on May 27, 1987 . . . the corporation, Domcoy Enterprises, 
Inc., was the sole owner of the Rossi Hills property . . . . The defendant Doms did not re-
acquire any interest in Rossi Hills property until August 20, 1988 . . .." 
(R. 8353-52; Addendum 10). Because of these findings, the trial court, in its supplemental 
conclusions, concluded that rescission was not available because, inter alia, joint action by 
co-owners is required, it was not possible to return all parties to the status quo because 
McCoy's one-half interest had been sold, and neither Doms nor McCoy had ownership 
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rights when Doms attempted to rescind, therefore, he could not tender the property. 
(R. 8353-52; AddendumlO). Because of these conclusions and die supporting findings, the 
trial court's decision that rescission was unavailable should be affirmed by this Court 
because Doms did not own the property and thus, could not tender it back to plaintiffs. 
D. The court's supplemental findings demonstrate the Doms had no basis for rescission. 
Rescission is an equitable remedy which is available to a party only if the party has 
some basis to invoke it. Rescission is permitted only under limited circumstances including 
unilateral mistake, Mostrong v. Jackson, 866 P.2d 573, 579 (Utah App. 1993), which is 
not applicable in this case, or in the case of breach or fraud or misrepresentation. See. 
e.g.. Coalville Citv v. Lundgren. 930 P.2d 1206 (Utah App. 1997). Furthermore, 
rescission is inappropriate when a legal remedy such as damages is adequate. Coalville 
Citv 930 P.2d at 1210; Erisman v. Overman. 358 P.2d 85, 88 (Utah 1961). In other 
words, there must be some basis for the party to invoke the remedy of rescission. In this 
case, as the supplemental findings adequately demonstrate, Doms had no such basis. 
The trial court specifically found Doms' claims for rescission were based on two 
theories—first, that Doms claimed he was entitled to rescission because of a violation of the 
covenants against encumbrances as contained in the warranty deed, and second, that Doms 
was entitled to rescission based on fraud. (R. 8535-52; Addendum 10). However, die trial 
court also determined that Doms had full knowledge of the encumbrances before he 
purchased die property. In tiiis case, me evidence shows that before the sale Doms viewed 
the property in the company of a real estate agent who drove him into the property over the 
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easement that Doms later claimed violated the deed covenants and the intrusions or 
encumbrances were known to him. (R. 7661, 7664, 7667-8) Indeed, the trial court 
specifically found that Doms knew "there were roads and sheds on the property" and that 
Doms had "actual knowledge of the easement encroachments" before he entered in the 
transaction. (R. 6883) Because this finding, which Doms does not dispute, is adequately 
supported by the evidence, Doms1 first basis for asserting that he was entitled to rescission, 
that the covenants against encumbrances contained in the warranty deed had been violated, 
is insupportable. Therefore, the trial court had ample reason to deny rescission to Doms. 
The trial court also found that Domsf second theory for asserting rescission, fraud, 
was also inapplicable. Specifically, the trial court found in its supplemental findings that 
there was "no fraud or misrepresentation involved in the sale." (R. 8535-52;Addendum 
10). The court concluded Doms had produced insufficient evidence to prove allegations 
that some of the plaintiffs had made material misrepresentations concerning Rossi Hills. (R. 
6896). This conclusion was based, in part, on the statement of Doms1 counsel during the 
second trial that Doms did not "intend to call any witnesses with respect to fraud and 
misrepresentation, and that should resolve that." (R. 7763) Therefore, as admitted by 
Doms himself, his second basis for invoking rescission is without support. 
Since there was no breach and no fraud or misrepresentation in this case, the remedy 
of rescission was unavailable to Doms as the trial court correctly ruled. 
E. Doms1 failure to properly request rescission waived his right to rescission. 
The trial court1 s reasoning was partly based on Doms1 failure to promptly to request 
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rescission. Rescission is an equitable remedy and therefore, to repair damage as quickly 
as possible by restoring the parties to their original positions, courts have always required 
prompt notification of intent to rescind. Doms has argued that his notice of rescission was 
promptly made after he "obtained knowledge" of the encumbrances. However, Doms has 
admitted that the rescission request was not filed for at least three years after the purchase.6 
Doms knew of the encumbrances before he purchased the property. The trial court 
found that Doms knew that "there were roads and sheds on the property." (R. 6883) The 
court specifically found that Doms had "actual notice of the easement encroachments 
between October 22, 1981 and November 7, 1981" and that Doms' subsequent actions 
demonstrate that he had "personal knowledge of the road encroachments no later than 
October of 1982." (R. 6883) Finally, the court found that Doms "knew or should have 
known at the time he purchased the Rossi Hills property and the Slipper Parcel that the 
integrated development of the three parcels had failed..." (R. 6882) Based on these and 
other findings, the court concluded that Doms waited an unreasonable time after he had 
knowledge of the road and other encroachments to seek rescission and therefore, rescission 
was barred. However, this Court refused to accept the unconscionable delay as a sufficient 
basis for the trial court's conclusion that rescission was not available to Doms. 
In fact, unreasonable delay alone may support denial of a rescission claim. Doms 
6
 In fact, as the trial court found, Doms' lack of ownership of the property 
prevented his tender of the property until mid-1988. For the purposes of this section of 
the argument only however, plaintiffs assume that Doms' request appeared when he 
said it did, in 1985. 
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has relied primarily on Breuer-Harrison, Inc. v. Combe, 799 P.2d 716 (Utah App. 1990) 
to argue that his long wait before seeking rescission did not evidence a lack of diligence on 
his part. Doms has stated that in Breuer-Harrison, this Court affirmed the trial court's 
granting of rescission even though the buyers had delayed five years in seeking rescission 
after they obtained knowledge of an easement. Doms1 interpretation of Breuer-Harrison 
is inaccurate. In Breuer-Harrison. the court's opinion stated that evidence established that 
the buyers did not know of an underground easement across the property, which they had 
purchased in 1979, until "sometime in 1983." 799P.2dat724. The opinion further stated 
that the buyers first raised the "option of rescinding the contract" in August, 1984, perhaps 
less than one year after discovery of the easement. 799 P.2d at 722. Therefore, contrary 
to Doms' claim, Breuer-Harrison does not support his position that a five-year wait for a 
rescission is permissible, rather, Breuer-Harrison. supports the proposition that buyers must 
act promptly in seeking rescission. This was the trial court's position here. 
In Perrv.485 P.2d at 815, and Erisman. 358 P.2d at 87, the Utah Supreme Court 
held that a delay of mere months in exercising a decision to rescind was a sufficient delay 
to prohibit invocation of the remedy of rescission. In this case, at least three years expired 
before the corporation Domcoy Enterprises, Inc., discussed settlement with plaintiff's 
attorneys and more than six years before Doms individually requested rescission. Doms 
simply waited too long to invoke rescission as found by the trial court. The trial court was 
correct in its conclusion that Doms was therefore barred from invoking rescission. 
Doms' attempts to justify his unreasonable delay in seeking rescission by arguing that 
19 
plaintiffs' misrepresentations "induced him to purchase Rossi Hills" and form a basis for 
rescission. In making this argument, as noted above, Doms fails to acknowledge that (1) 
he introduced insufficient evidence of any misrepresentation, (2) the trial court found that 
Doms was aware of the actual facts surrounding the property at least four months before 
he purchased the property, (3) Doms' continued payments after he knew of the facts waived 
any claim of rescission, and (4) the case law holds that a party seeking rescission based on 
misrepresentation must act within a reasonable time after the truth is revealed. 
The trial court found that Doms had produced insufficient evidence to prove his 
allegations that the plaintiffs had made material representations concerning Rossi Hills. (R. 
6896) Doms simply fails to recognize these findings by the trial court. Doms clearly did 
not act promptly to rescind. 
F. The trial court properly found Plaintiffs were prejudiced by Doms' delay. 
As directed by this Court on remand, the trial court entered findings on prejudice. 
Specifically, the trial court found: 
10. The first offer for rescission by either of the defendant parties was made 
by Doms through the filings of his second amended counterclaim on or about 
June, 1988, which was more than six years after the completion of the 
purchase agreement and after he obtained knowledge of the claimed defects. 
The court found and now finds that this is a grossly unreasonable delay in 
requesting rescission for the following reasons: 
a. Doms had the use and benefit of the property to the exclusion of the 
plaintiffs. He purchased the Slipper Parcel and attempted to formulate a plan 
for a three-parcel integrated development, but was unsuccessful. The 
plaintiffs are now foreclosed from developing an integrated development 
because Doms has an interest in the slipper parcel, and the likelihood of 
Doms cooperating with the plaintiffs in an integrated development is remote. 
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b. Doms failed to pay the property taxes for the years 1982, 1983, 1984, 
1985 and 1986, which resulted in a tax sale and required the plaintiffs to 
initiate legal action to clear the title. 
c. D.C. Anderson, one of the principals in the transaction, died while Doms 
was in possession of the property, thus making it impossible to elicit 
testimony from the decedent. 
d. Domsf delay of more than six years before he sought to rescind the 
transaction adversely affected the plaintiffs1 opportunity to resolve the 
encroachment and easement problems because witness would be unavailable 
and memories were dimmed by the lapse of time. 
e. During the time that Doms, Domcoy Enterprises, Inc. and Summit 
County were in possession of the property, the property suffered at 50% 
reduction in its value. 
f. Doms1 inexperience in developing property or inability to sell the 
property impacted the plaintiffs greatly because of a downturn in the real 
estate market and the increased costs to develop the property if they choose 
to do so. 
g. Doms should not benefit from his poor decisions at the expense of the 
plaintiffs. To allow that to happen would be inequitable. 
h. Doms was in default; therefore could not invoke the doctrine of 
rescission. 
(R. 8535-52; Addendum 10). 
Rather than being irrelevant, as claimed by Doms, these findings directly 
demonstrate the prejudice suffered by the plaintiffs due to Doms' delay in requesting 
rescission. For example, Finding 10a noted first that Doms had the benefit of the property 
to the exclusion of the plaintiffs during the six-year period between the time of the purchase 
and the time of tender of the rescission offer. This portion of Finding 10a is directly 
derived from Taylor v. Moore, which clearly states that a party is not allowed to "go on 
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deriving all possible benefits from the transaction, and then claim to be relieved of his own 
obligations by seeking its rescission." 51 P.2d at 227 quoting 4 R.C.L. 514. In Taylor, 
the Utah Supreme Court explained that an extended period of dominion over land evidenced 
incidents of ownership which are inconsistent with rescission and are detrimental and 
prejudicial to the other party. The same types of benefits were derived by Doms and 
Domcoy and were detrimental and prejudicial to Plaintiffs' ownership as the court found. 
Furthermore, the second portion of Finding 10a noted that Doms had acquired the 
Slipper Parcel from a third party and attempted to formulate a plan for a three-parcel 
integrated development that was unsuccessful. The finding stated that Plaintiffs are 
foreclosed from developing an integrated development, which is the only possible use for 
the land because of Doms' interest in the slipper parcel. Indeed, this demonstrates that 
while Doms exercised dominion over the land on which he now seeks rescission, the 
character of the surrounding lands changed by virtue of the change in ownership of the 
lands. Doms' attempts to develop an integrated development have spoiled the chances of 
plaintiffs ever being able to make such a development. Because of the immovable positions 
of the parties which developed during the pendency of this litigation and because of Doms' 
acquisition of the slipper parcel, any potential development of the land is now impossible 
to the prejudice of the plaintiffs. 
Finding 10b stated that Doms failed to pay property taxes on the property for a 
period of five years which resulted in a tax sale and required plaintiffs to initiate legal 
action to clear title. This prejudiced plaintiffs because they were required to enter and 
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defend land which they thought they had sold. Because of Doms' failure to pay taxes the 
land could have been sold to a third party adverse to both Doms and plaintiffs, but for 
plaintiffs move to clear title to the property. While plaintiffs were reimbursed for some of 
the fees they expended, they were not reimbursed for all of the fees which were required 
and therefore were prejudiced by Doms1 actions. 
Finding 10c stated that one of the plaintiffs had died while Doms was in possession 
of the property. This was prejudicial to the plaintiffs because obviously Anderson, who 
significantly participated in the negotiations concerning the land, could not offer testimony 
to refute Doms' claims. As noted above, if Doms is permitted to rescind, the rescission 
would have to be based on one of Doms1 two theories. Either of those two theories would 
have required the testimony of plaintiff Anderson. Furthermore, because any interest 
Anderson had passed to his estate upon his death, the plaintiffs cannot be returned to the 
status quo should rescission occur. See, e j ^ , Jacobsen v. Jacobsen, 557 P.2d 156, 159 
(Utah 1976) (A party was held to be prejudiced by the dying of one of the original parties 
"so his testimony as to the version of transaction is no longer available." )Therefore, the 
death of plaintiff Anderson has clearly prejudiced plaintiffs. 
Finding lOd noted that Doms1 delay of more than six years before seeking rescission 
adversely affected plaintiff's opportunities to resolve the encroachment issues and easement 
problem because witnesses would be unavailable and memories would be dimmed by the 
lapse of time. Legal actions by the plaintiffs to clear the encroachments and easements 
should they be forced to re-acquire the property through rescission would now be virtually 
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impossible. Doms did nothing in an effort to clear the encroachments and the easements. 
Finding lOe stated that while Doms, Domcoy Enterprises and Summit County were 
in possession of the property, the property suffered a 50% reduction in its value. In fact, 
evidence presented at the trial indicated that the value had depreciated to about 37% of the 
original value by the time of Doms' action. (R. 7825, 7937) Indeed, this fact is borne out 
by Doms' own actions. Doms only sought rescission when he could not develop the three 
parcels, and the value of the land made it a liability rather than an asset. In its 
memorandum decision, this Court stated that decrease in value alone might not be sufficient 
to establish a finding of prejudice. However, none of the cases cited by the court 
demonstrate the incredible decrease in value which occurred in this case.7 
Finding lOf also impacts on this example of prejudice. Not only has the property 
decreased substantially in value during the time Doms has held the property, but because 
of Doms' inept actions, any opportunity for the plaintiffs to develop the property now 
would cost them considerably more. 
For all of the foregoing reasons rescission was properly held by the trial court not 
to be a remedy available to Doms, and this Court should affirm that ruling. 
POINT H 
(Response to Doms' Point II) 
"In Child v. Child. 332 P.2d 981, 988 (Utah 1958), the property seemed to have 
increased in value to the benefit of the party against whom rescission was sought. This 
also seemed to be the case in Fitzgerald v. O'Connell. 386 A.2d 1385, 1388 (R. I. 
1978). Indeed, in most instances, the property increased in value, making rescission 
attractive to the party against whom it was sought. That is simply not die case here. 
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DOMS IS NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS. 
On this appeal, Doms renews an argument he made in the initial appeal. Doms 
argues that the Plaintiffs have assailed and disputed Doms' title to Rossi Hills in both the 
main action (Civil No. 8339) and the quiet title action in the tax-sale case (Civil No. 
10066). Doms therefore claims he is entitled to attorney fees incurred in sustaining his tide 
to Rossi Hills. He furtiier claims that he should have prejudgment interest on the attorney 
fees, that he should be awarded costs and that he should receive an award of fees for the 
appeal. These claims fail for the reasons which follow. 
In the trial court, Doms did not claim attorney fees because the plaintiffs "assailed 
and disputed" his tide. In his "Trial Brief Regarding Issues of Prejudgment Interest and 
Attorney Fees" dated January 4, 1991, Doms requested attorney fees for tiiree different 
reasons: (1) as "consequential damages" resulting from plaintiffs' breach of contract, (2) 
as a result of plaintiffs' breach of the earnest money agreement, and (3) because plaintiffs 
had brought "meridess claims" and asserted defenses in bad faith. (R.4051-4123) 
Nowhere did Doms claim attorney fees for having to defend his "tide" to the property. 
This Court cannot consider an argument which is made for the first time on appeal. 
Wurst v. Dept. of Employment Sec. 818 P. 2d 1036, 1039 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) ("It is 
well-settled that this Court will not address an issue raised for the first time on appeal.") 
If the court addresses the substance of Doms' claims, they fail for the following reasons. 
A. Doms'"title" was not attacked. 
Nothing in me foreclosure action (Civil No. 8339) attacks Doms' tide. The 
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foreclosure action was brought simply to foreclose on the trust deed and a trust deed note 
which Doms and McCoy had signed. Doms' second amended counterclaim is based solely 
on a breach of the covenant and warranties against easements and encumbrances. Nothing 
is claimed with respect to a breach of a covenant of "warranty" or "quiet enjoyment" or any 
other warranty or covenant other than "easements and encumbrances." Consequently, 
Forrer v. Sather. 595 P.2d 1306 (Utah 1979), cited by Doms in support of his contention 
that he should have received attorney fees is inapposite because that case specifically 
concerned breach of the covenant of warranty. Nothing inany of the motions, memoranda, 
or other documents filed by Doms in the trial court ever asserted a claim for breach of the 
covenant of "warranty" or "quiet enjoyment." 
Doms never requested the trial judge determine the "title" issue in the main case. 
The trial judge summarized Doms argument as admitting that the property owners along 
Ontario Avenue did not acquire fee title, but merely "prescriptive easements." (R. 8025) 
Doms never claimed that the property owners along Ontario Avenue had any "tide." 
Doms' allegations that the tax-sale case (Civil No. 10066) assailed or disputed his 
tide to Rossi Hills is not accurate. Civil No. 10066 was commenced because both Doms 
and his successor, Domcoy, failed to pay the taxes due under the trust deed on Rossi Hills 
for the years 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985 and 1986. (R. 00041) Had the tax sale not been set 
aside, the plaintiffs1 trust deed would have been extinguished by operation of law. This 
made Civil No. 10066 necessary. 
Consequendy, no basis exists for Doms1 statement that plaintiffs have attacked his 
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"title" to the property. In Espinoza v. Safeco Title Insurance Company, 598 P.2d 346 
(Utah 1979), the court clearly noted the law which has existed in Utah for over 70 years: 
"[N]o attorney fees are allowable against the grantor which are incurred in the action to 
recover such damages against said grantor." 598 P.2d at 348. In other words, a grantee 
may not recover attorney fees against the grantor in the grantee1 s action for a breach of the 
covenant against encumbrances, especially when the grantee has not paid anything to either 
purchase or extinguish the encumbrances and thus, has not been damaged. Even Forrer v. 
Sather, 595 P.2d 1306 (Utah 1979), cited by Doms, supports this general principle. 
Since Doms never paid anything to the property owners on Ontario Avenue to 
remove their loop road, sheds, fences, etc., and since he did not start any separate action 
to "quiet title" to these alleged title deficiencies, there is no basis for Doms to be awarded 
fees. He has no contract authorizing fees, and no statute in Utah allows such fees. 
B. Doms is not entitled to prejudgment interest or any award of attorney fees. 
Doms argues he is entitled to prejudgment interest on an award of attorney fees. 
This argument fails for three reasons. First, Doms is not entitled to attorney fees because 
(1) there is no written contract allowing fees to Doms, (2) there is no statute allowing fees 
to Doms, and (3) Doms is not entitled to fees under the third party attorney fees exception. 
Even if Doms were entided to attorney fees, prejudgment interest could not be awarded 
because any fees would have to be finally determined by the trial judge after an evidentiary 
hearing; they cannot be calculated with mathematical certainty. See Canyon Country Store 
v. Bracev, 781 P.2d 414, 422 (Utah 1989). 
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C. Doms is not entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs on appeal. 
Doms argues he is entitled to attorney fees and costs incurred on this appeal. Doms' 
argument presumes success. No basis exists for Doms' claim for attorney fees in the trial 
court and, therefore, there is no basis for awarding Doms any fees on appeal. 
D. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in not awarding costs to Doms. 
Doms argues he is entitled to costs, including costs of depositions. The trial court 
ruled that Doms was entitled to costs in the amount of $101.50. (R. 6885-86) 
Doms is not entitled to any further award of costs because he is not the prevailing 
party on his second amended counterclaim. The first cause of action dealing with rescission 
in the counterclaim was dismissed by Judge Rokich after the first segment of the trial in 
April 1990. Doms withdrew his second cause of action dealing with loss of profits for the 
Rossi Hills development. (R. 7927-30). The trial court dismissed that cause of action. (R. 
7930) On the third cause of action, Doms1 counsel admitted during the trial that he did not 
intend to call any witnesses with respect to fraud and misrepresentation issues and invited 
the court to make a ruling against him on that issue. (R. 7763-64) The court ruled that it 
did not find sufficient evidence to support the fraud or misrepresentation. (R. 7763-64) 
Nothing else exists in Doms' counterclaim to support an award of costs. 
Deposition costs are clearly within the discretion of the trial judge and it does not 
appear that any of the depositions Doms took were utilized by Doms at trial. Ames v. 
Maas, 846 P.2d 468 (Utah App. 1993). Finally, Doms' request for costs regarding travel 
expenses and other items in his memorandum of costs were not legitimate "costs" within 
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Rule 54(d) URCP. Cornish Town v. Koller. 817 P.2d 305 (Utah 1991). 
POINT m 
(Response to Doms' Point HI) 
PLAINTIFFS ARE ENTITLED TO ALL THE ATTORNEY FEES 
AWARDED BY THE TRIAL JUDGE PLUS ADDITIONAL FEES. 
In Point HI of his brief, Doms renews an issue which he raised in his initial cross-
appeal-that Plaintiffs were not entitled to the fees awarded them by the trial court. This 
argument fails for the following reasons. 
A. Doms has failed to show that the court abused its discretion in awarding attorney fees. 
Doms correcdy states that the standard of review for an award of attorney fees is 
abuse of discretion. Brief of Appellant at 1. Despite this, Doms fails to show that the trial 
court abused its discretion in awarding fees to Plaintiffs. Because of the trial court's 
advantaged position, the appellate court presumes that the " 'discretion of the trial court was 
properly exercised unless the record clearly shows to the contrary/" Equitable Life and 
Casualty Ins. Co. v. Ross, 849 P.2d 1187, 1194 (Utah App. 1993) (quoting Goddard v. 
Hickman, 685 P.2d 530, 534-35 (Utah 1984)). 
Nowhere in his opening brief does Doms ever attempt to marshal the evidence or 
demonstrate that the trial court1 s findings were supported by adequate evidence and should 
be sustained. Because Doms has failed to demonstrate that the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in the award of attorney fees, this issue should not be considered by this Court. 
B. Doms did not prevail on any of his counterclaims. 
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Doms states that with the exception of two categories of attorney fees awarded by 
the trial judge, ". . . all of the attorney's fees and costs awarded to Plaintiffs by the trial 
court are based on the legal conclusion that Doms was in default under the trust deed and 
trust deed note." Brief of Appellant at 33. Doms asserts that this conclusion was erroneous 
and that this conclusion was rejected by this Court in the earlier appeal. The latter claim 
is simply incorrect because this Court simply did not address the issue. With respect to the 
former issue, whether the trial court's ruling was erroneous, Doms apparently 
acknowledges that if this Court affirms the trial court's ruling that Doms was in default 
under the trust deed and trust deed note, then, it necessarily follows the trial court's award 
of the fees and costs is reasonable, necessary, and should be upheld. Doms was in default 
under the trust deed note and the trust deed. 
The major category of Plaintiffs' requested fees which Judge Rokich disallowed were 
those pertaining to Plaintiffs' successful defense to all three causes of action in Doms' 
second amended counterclaim. The court concluded the case of Stubbs v. Hemmert, 567 
P.2d 168 (Utah 1977), established that a party is never entitled to any attorney fees for legal 
services rendered in connection with an opposing party's counterclaim. 
Plaintiffs submit Stubbs does not stand for the proposition that a party is never 
entitled to attorney fees with respect to a successful defense of a counterclaim. In Stubbs, 
the court held the plaintiff was not entitled to fees for defending against a counterclaim 
because the plaintiff was not successful in defending against the counterclaim and because 
the counterclaim did not relate to the issues raised in the plaintiff's main complaint. 567 
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P.2d at 171. In Dixie State Bank v. Bracken. 764 P.2d 985 (Utah 1988), the court not only 
recognized the legal basis for, but actually awarded substantial attorney fees for all work 
done by the bank's attorneys in defending against an unsuccessful counterclaim. 
The defense to Doms' counterclaim for rescission was absolutely necessary as part 
of the foreclosure action because without that defense, the trust deed and trust deed note 
would have been rescinded and the foreclosure action would have been dismissed. The 
only other cause of action in the counterclaim dealt with a loss-of-profits claim. Plaintiffs 
spent a great deal of time with expert witnesses to defend against this claim. During cross-
examination of Doms1 appraiser, Doms1 counsel withdrew the claim. (R. 7927-30) He 
also stated he was not going to make any claim for "consequential damages." (R. 7971) 
Since Plaintiffs were successful in defending against all three causes of action stated 
in the counterclaim which would have eviscerated the trust deed and note, both of which 
contain provisions for the award of attorney fees, Plaintiffs are entitled to attorney fees as 
the prevailing parties. The trial court also ruled Plaintiffs should be awarded costs and 
expenses incurred in defending against those causes which Doms withdrew. 
Dixie State Bank provides authority for an award to Plaintiffs of all attorney fees 
incurred in defending against Doms1 unsuccessful second amended counterclaim. Doms 
has been stubbornly litigious in the instant case, just as the defendants were in Dixie State 
Bank. The best example of the "stubbornly litigious" stance taken by Doms in the instant 
case can be seen in the numerous, unfounded objections which Doms filed to legitimate 
discovery requests during the 1989 discovery period and the fact he withdrew or abandoned 
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his second and third causes of action. (R. 7763 and 7928,30) Doms objected to virtually 
all the requests for production of documents and requests for admissions submitted by 
Plaintiffs. Doms' counsel also directed him not to answer questions at his deposition and 
stonewalled any efforts to obtain answers to legitimate questions. Based on this hardened 
stance and stubborn refusal to comply with the liberal discovery rules, Judge Frederick 
levied sanctions against Doms. (R. 01739) 
Because of Doms1 actions Plaintiffs were obligated to commence a third-party 
complaint against Summit County Tide Company ("SCTC") in which they asked that 
SCTC indemnify them for any damages which Doms was entitled to under his 
counterclaim. The claim was upheld by the trial judge following a hearing on SCTC's 
motion to dismiss. (R. 02943) This category of fees is not involved in the instant appeal, 
however, the third-party complaint was necessary and reasonable at the time it was filed. 
Doms1 statement that plaintiffs1 counsel, "Either admitted in their affidavits or in 
their testimony at the hearing on attorneys fees that all of their requested fees were incurred 
defending against Doms1 second amended counterclaim in the main case," is false. 
Plaintiffs' Exhibit 3-P at the December 31, 1991, evidentiary hearing on attorney fees 
demonstrates that all the fees did not relate solely to Domsf counterclaim. However, even 
if they did, Plaintiffs' defenses were necessary to protect the tide and the validity of the 
trust deed which authorized attorney fees for services in appearing and defending the title 
to the property and the rights of the beneficiaries. (Exhibit 2, paragraph 4). 
C. Plaintiffs are entitled to attorney fees and costs incurred in Civil No. 10066, the tax-sale 
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case. (Doms' Point IIIB) 
Doms had an obligation under the trust deed to pay all taxes on Rossi Hills. He 
failed to pay any of the taxes. The taxes became delinquent in 1982, and were also 
delinquent for 1983, 1984, 1985, and 1986. On May 27, 1987, Summit County held a tax 
sale to sell Rossi Hills. No one bid at the tax sale, therefore, the Summit County Auditor 
conveyed the property in fee simple title to Summit County. The impact of this conveyance 
was to extinguish Plaintiffs1 trust deed. See Hanson v. Burris, 46 P.2d 400, 406 (Utah 
1935). Clearly, Doms and his successor corporation, Domcoy, were in default under the 
terms of the trust deed with respect to the taxes, irrespective of other defaults with respect 
to the monthly payments. 
Doms states that he entered into a stipulation in court agreeing the tax sale could be 
declared void. Doms then asserts that because of the stipulation, no attorney fees should 
be given to Plaintiffs. What Doms neglects to disclose is that for the preceding year and 
a half, he resisted every effort to stipulate that the sale could be set aside. He filed an 
original answer and also an amended answer denying all Plaintiffs' claims for relief. 
Furthermore, Doms required Plaintiffs to conduct extensive discovery, including taking the 
depositions of numerous Summit County officials. Doms required Plaintiffs to prepare a 
motion and memorandum for summary judgment in the tax case. After all of this and a 
hearing on March 20, 1990, the court entered an order granting Plaintiffs1 motion for 
summary judgment. 
Doms* claim that because he "stipulated" that the tax sale could be set aside he 
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should not be responsible for the payment for the attorney fees incurred by Plaintiffs is 
absurd. The law is clear that even if Doms had stipulated to an amount claimed by 
Plaintiffs after the lawsuit was commenced, Plaintiffs would still be entitied to their attorney 
fees. Mountain States Broadcasting v. Neale. 776 P.2d 643 (Utah App. 1989), Cobabe v. 
Crawford. 780 P.2d 834 (Utah App. 1988). 
Doms argues there can be no attorney fees awarded for the tax case" since Doms was 
excused from performance and not in default under the Trust Deed and Trust Deed Note, 
plaintiffs have absolutely no basis upon which to claim attorney's fees or costs." Again, 
it follows that if the trial judge is right that Doms was not excused from performance but 
was in default under the trust deed and the trust deed note, then all the attorney fees 
incurred in the tax case should be awarded as provided in the instruments. 
Furuiermore, when Doms claims that he had nothing to do with the manner in which 
the tax sale was conducted, he is asking this Court to overlook the fact that he had the sole 
responsibility to pay the taxes on the property, and because he neglected to do so, me 
property was sold for the delinquent taxes. Doms' default in the payment of the taxes due 
under the trust deed resulted in the auditor's conveying the fee simple tide to Summit 
County and Doms cannot escape his responsibility for attorney fees by saying that somehow 
the tax sale was a result of the conduct of mird parties. 
D. Plaintiffs are entitled to attorney fees and costs pursuant to their motions for sanctions 
with respect to Doms' objections to discovery requests. (Doms' Point HIE) 
In Point DTE, Doms says Judge Frederick was wrong in awarding attorney fees to 
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Plaintiffs for substantial legal services made necessary because of Doms1 stubborn refusal 
to answer legitimate discovery requests. These fees were awarded pursuant to Rule 37 of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Plaintiffs submit Judge Frederick was completely justified in finding Doms violated 
discovery provisions of the rules. Of the thirty-five requests for production of documents, 
Doms objected to twenty-seven of them. Of the thirty-one requests for admissions 
submitted to Doms, his counsel objected to fifteen of them. The frivolous grounds for the 
objections and the stubbornness of Doms in refusing to respond to these discovery requests 
is more fully documented and discussed in "Involuntary Plaintiffs Anderson and Scott's 
Memorandum in Support of Their Motion for Sanctions Against the Defendant Eugene E. 
Doms" dated April 18, 1989. In his minute entry, Judge Frederick directed Doms, "To 
respond to the discovery requests within thirty days of this minute entry ruling. Movant 
is granted reasonable attorney fees for the necessity of bringing motions; amount to be 
determined at trial." 
After Judge Frederick entered his June 22, 1989 minute entry, Doms filed a flurry 
of motions disagreeing with Judge Frederick on every point and requesting an inordinate 
amount of relief. Some twenty-five pleadings were filed by Doms and Plaintiffs in 
connection with this matter. On August 10, 1989, Judge Frederick issued a second minute 
entry which denied all of Doms' motions. The minute entry again awarded attorney fees 
to Plaintiffs. Thereafter, on August 28, 1989 (R1968-9), Judge Frederick signed an order 
setting out the substance of the two prior Minute Entries and also setting forth a partial list 
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of the twenty-five pleadings which were involved and for which he awarded Plaintiffs fees. 
In addition to the problems caused by Doms' refusal to answer legitimate discovery 
requests, Doms' counsel also advised him at his deposition on June 9, 1989, not to answer 
numerous questions. These objections were based on the same reasons Doms had objected 
to discovery requests. After Judge Frederick entered his rulings, it was necessary to take 
a supplemental deposition of Doms which caused the Plaintiffs to incur additional expense. 
Doms argues that he was not afforded an opportunity for a hearing before the amount 
of fees was assessed. This assertion is simply incredible in light of the fact that an entire 
day on December 31, 1991, was devoted to an evidentiary hearing regarding attorney fees. 
At that time, all counsel were permitted to testify regarding the fees and to submit 
affidavits or other evidence regarding the fees, costs and expenses. At the conclusion of 
the hearing counsel were allowed to engage in argument regarding the fees. Plaintiffs 
submit they are entitled to their full requested attorney fees of $11,875.00, together with 
prejudgment interest, since all of these fees were reasonable and necessary and were 
incurred because of Doms1 refusal to comply with legitimate discovery requests. E. The 
judgment of the trial court should be affirmed with respect to the fees and costs awarded 
to Plaintiffs, but it should be substantially augmented. (Doms Point IIIG) 
In Point IIIG, Doms argues the trial court's award of $41,000.00 in attorney fees and 
$358.20 in costs to Plaintiffs should be reversed. As discussed above, the attorney fees and 
costs awarded are not only justified by the evidence, but are only a small part of the fees 
and costs which were incurred by Plaintiffs solely because of the stubborn and litigious 
nature of Doms' tactics. Plaintiffs submit they are entitled to all their attorney fees and 
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court costs incurred as fully set forth in Exhibits 1-P, 3-P, 4-P, 5-P, 6-P, 7-P, and 8-P 
which were introduced at the evidentiary hearing. 
With respect to costs, the Rule 54(d) "costs" requested by Plaintiffs are more fully 
set forth in the "Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Costs and Disbursements" dated October 22, 
1991. Exhibit "7" attached to the Mcintosh Affidavit itemizes $22,866.39 in additional 
"costs and expenses" which were authorized by the trust deed and the trust deed note in 
addition to the Rule 54(d) costs. The trial court refused to allow any of these items, even 
though the trial judge specifically stated during the trial that a portion of the costs and 
expenses paid to the expert witnesses would be awarded to Plaintiffs because of Doms1 
withdrawal of his second cause of action. (R. 7928-7930) The court further admitted 
during the proceedings that Plaintiffs were entitled to attorney fees for all the work which 
was done subsequent to the court's memorandum decision dated October 4,1990 and which 
resulted in the court's change of heart regarding the original finding that Doms was not 
excused by in performance and was not in default. (R. 6485). Under these circumstances, 
Plaintiffs submit they are entitled to all the fees, costs and expenses incurred with the 
exception of those fees, costs, and expenses relating to the third-party complaint against 
Summit County Title Company. 
Plaintiffs are also entided to their "costs and expenses," in addition to attorney fees. 
These "costs and expenses" are expressly provided in the trust deed note and the trust deed 
and are much broader than the Rule 54(d) "costs." The language in the trust deed note 
states "If this note is collected by an attorney after default and the payment of principal or 
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interest, either with or without suit, the undersigned, jointly and severally, agree to pay all 
costs and expenses of collection, including a reasonable attorneys fee." The phrase "all 
costs and expenses of collection" is much broader than the statutory provision. Paragraph 
16 in the trust deed provides that upon default the beneficiary shall have the option to 
declare all sums immediately due and payable and foreclose the trust deed in the manner 
provided by law and "Beneficiary shall be entitled to recovery in such proceeding all costs 
and expenses incident thereto, including a reasonable attorneys fee in such amount as shall 
be fixed by the court." (Addendum 4). Again, this provision allows Plaintiffs to obtain all 
their "costs and expenses" incurred in the lawsuit to foreclose their trust deed. 
PLAINTIFFS' CROSS-APPEAL 
In its memorandum opinion in this case, this Court found several issues raised by 
Plaintiffs "to be without merit." Anderson, Slip op. at 2. However, the court also noted: 
Because it is possible that the trial court will order the contract 
rescinded due to the lack of evidence in the record concerning prejudice, we 
need not address the other claims raised. However, in the event the trial 
court does not rescind the transaction, the trial court should note that its 
findings and conclusions do not adequately treat the effect of the intervening 
conveyances to and from Domcoy on Doms's right to pursue his counterclaim 
and the effect of the default judgment entered against McCoy and the sheriff's 
sale of McCoy's interest in Rossi Hills on Doms's ownership interest in the 
property and any damages for breach of title warranties. 
Anderson, Slip op. at 3 n.2 (emphasis added). In light of the trial court's subsequent 
resolution of the case after remand, Plaintiffs present the following issues. 
POINT IV 
DOMS IS NOT ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF DAMAGES AGAINST PLAINTIFFS 
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BECAUSE HE ONLY OWNED AN UNDIVIDED ONE-HALF (%) INTEREST 
SUBJECT TO THE TRUST DEED. 
In order to comply with the order of the court regarding the effect of intervening 
conveyances, it is necessary to examine all conveyances occurring after Doms and McCoy 
acquired tide. Those conveyances include: As part of the purchase price, Doms and 
McCoy transferred title to the Trustee to secure their Promissory Note. The Trust Deed 
(Addendum 3) vested the legal title of Doms and McCoy in the Trustee, who held it in trust 
for them and the beneficiaries. Any subsequent transfer by Doms and/or McCoy and/or 
Domcoy was subject to this primary title. On August 30, 1983, Doms and McCoy 
conveyed Rossi HUls to Domcoy Enterprises. (Exhibit 16) On August 26,1988, more than 
three years after the complaint was filed and more than six years after the original deed to 
Doms and McCoy, Doms obtained a deed from Domcoy. (Exhibit 17) Therefore, for the 
first time since the start of the foreclosure action, Doms could claim some type of 
ownership or color of title in the Rossi Hills property. 
The trial court found on remand that the Sheriffs sale transferred the interests of 
McCoy to Plaintiffs. (Order on Court's Minute Entry, at 9; Addendumll) However, the 
court also found that McCoy had no ownership interest at the time the sheriffs deed was 
issued. Id. Based on its findings, the trial concluded that: 
The default Judgment entered against McCoy and the sheriffs sale of 
McCoy's interest in Rossi Hills has no effect on Doms's ownership interest 
in the property and his ability to collect damages for breach of title 
warranties, because McCoy had no ownership interest in Rossi Hills when the 
sheriffs sale pursuant to the default judgment against McCoy was conducted; 
and plaintiffs, therefore, acquired no ownership interest in the property from 
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the sheriffs sale. 
(Order on Court's Minute Entry at 5; Addendumll) This conclusion of law is incorrect, 
contrary to the Court's Supplemental Findings and Conclusions. There, the court stated, 
"The undivided interest of Michael McCoy was sold at Sheriffs Sale so that only fifty 
percent (50%) of the property could be tendered for rescission." (Addendum 10). The 
conclusion should be corrected for a variety of reasons. 
First, the trustee holds the title of both Doms and McCoy in trust for them and the 
beneficiaries of the trust. This trust tide may only be acquired by: (a) a release of the 
Trustee's ownership, which is accomplished by the trustee's Deed of Reconveyance; (b) 
foreclosure of the grantors interest by either following the procedure authorized for Trustee 
foreclosure, or by foreclosing the interest as a mortgage, which is authorized by 
UCA §57-1-34. The beneficiaries of this Trust Deed, Anderson and Scott, elected to 
foreclose by proceeding under the provisions authorizing the foreclosure of the Trust Deed 
in the manner provided for foreclosure of a mortgage. 
A special execution was issued, and the Sheriff conducted a sale. Subsequent to the 
sale, and after expiration of the redemption period, a Sheriffs Deed (Addendum 5) was 
issued conveying McCoy's undivided one-half interest in the property to Plaintiffs, the high 
bidders at the sale. No redemption was made. Doms' undivided one-half interest 
remained in the Trustee, but Doms had transferred and conveyed such encumbered 
equitable interest to Domcoy. Further, Doms in court reviewed the Sheriffs Deed and 
insisted on a correction to indicate the deed only affected McCoy's interest. (Addendum 5) 
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The sale and transfer by Doms and McCoy to Domcoy exhausted their right to claim 
damages against Plaintiffs. The covenant against encumbrances is a personal covenant and 
does not run with the land._See, e,g., Beeslev v. Badger. 240 P. 458 (Utah 1925) (the 
covenant against encumbrance was a personal covenant, "not running with the land." ). 
Other authorities agree, For example, 7G Thompson, Commentaries on the Modern Law 
of Real Property, at §3185 at 303, §3186 at 306 states: "Under the majority rule the 
covenant against encumbrances is a personal one and does not run with the land. . . . A 
covenant against encumbrances is broken on the delivery of the deed, if an encumbrance 
on the land then exists." In addition, 6A R. Powell, The Law of Real Property, f900(5} 
at 91A-150-151 (1993), states: "Because of the common law repugnance to champerty, this 
cause of action historically was not transmissible to the successors of the grantee. Thus, 
it did not run with the land." 
This well established legal principle requires that Doms must claim under the deed 
from Anderson and Scott. The covenant is a personal covenant and the measure of damages 
would be any loss that might result by reason of the sale of the real estate to the 
corporation. Doms was entitled only to one-half of the damages, if any, mat are properly 
proven since he was oflty a one-half owner. For example, in the event of a sale of the 
property, he would be entitled to one-half of the sale proceeds and no more. 
Subsequent transfers between or among Doms and Domcoy could only affect the 
one-half interest held by Mr. Doms which was subject to the trust deed. The transfer by 
Doms of his interest in the real estate could only involve his interest subject to the Trust 
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Deed. Supplemental Finding and Decree (Addendum 10). A grantor cannot grant an estate 
larger than that which is vested in him. As a result, all transfers to or among Doms and 
Domcoy are subject to this limitation. The portion of the judgment that purports to quiet 
title without regard to the trust deed is without supporting evidence or law. 
If the tax sale deed to Summit County was valid, it would have eliminated right or 
tide of the trustee and Domcoy. Fortunately, the tax sale was not conducted properly and 
Plaintiffs, in order to protect their interest, the interest of the Trustee and the interest of 
Domcoy instituted action against Summit County which resulted in a judgment to the effect 
that the tax sale was invalid and that Domcoy Enterprises, Inc., was the owner of one-half 
interest, subject to the Trust Deed. (6896, 7069). 
POINT V 
DOMS WAS PRECLUDED FROM A TRIAL ON DAMAGES FOR BREACH OF 
WARRANTY. 
Doms' final second amended counterclaim requested both rescission and damages 
for loss of profits as a result of the alleged breach of warranty against encumbrances in the 
warranty deed. (R. 237-42) Because both of these remedies were based on the same cause 
of action, plaintiffs requested the trial court to order Doms to elect which remedy he chose 
to pursue. (R. 4124-39). Before the trial on the issue of rescission, the trial court required 
Doms to elect his remedy. (R. 7087) Doms elected rescission as the appropriate remedy. 
(R. 7087) The trial court affirmed this decision when it stated, "You can't have it both 
ways, you want a rescission and you want in the alternative. On the other hand, you want 
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this Court to proceed on damages and on the other hand, I ruled against you so you want 
it both ways. You can't have it both ways." (R. 7759) However, after Doms lost on the 
remedy of rescission under his allegation of breach of warranty, the trial court allowed him 
to proceed on the issue of damages under the same breach of warranty allegations. 
In Cook v. Covev-Ballard Motor Co., 253 P. 196 (Utah 1927), the Utah Supreme 
Court defined when a party who elects his remedy and fails is foreclosed from pursuing an 
alternative remedy. The court stated: 
The true rule seems to be (1) that there must be, in fact, 
two or more coexistent remedies upon which the party has the 
right to elect; (2) the remedies thus open to him must be 
alternative and inconsistent; and (3) he must by actually 
bringing an action or by some other decisive act, with 
knowledge of the facts, indicate his choice between these 
inconsistent remedies .... With such elements present, an 
election once deliberately made by the institution of a suit, by 
which the remedy is sought to be recovered, is final, and his 
failure to secure satisfaction by means of the remedy which he 
adopted furnishes no legal reason to permit him to resort to the 
other. 
253 P. at 199-200. Thus, the pursuit of a remedy to an adjudication forecloses pursuit of 
the other remedy even if the pursuit of the first remedy proves futile. Mendenhall v. 
Kingston. 610 P.2d 1287, 1289 (Utah, 1980). 
Here, once the trial court held that Doms was not entided to rescission (R. 4244-50), 
it should not have proceeded to determine whether Doms was entided to damages. All of 
the factors listed in Cook were satisfied. Doms had two coexisting remedies on which he 
had a right to elect. The remedies were alternative and inconsistent since both requested 
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different remedies were based on the same underlying cause of action, breach of the 
covenant against encumbrances contained in the warranty deed. Finally, in open court, 
Doms elected rescission as his remedy, a decisive act which indicated his choice between 
the inconsistent remedies. Therefore, his failure on the breach of warranty claim when he 
requested rescission as the remedy should have foreclosed the subsequent action seeking 
damages. When the trial court allowed him to proceed, it effectively gutted the election of 
remedies doctrine. Because Doms elected his remedy and failed to convince the court that 
it was appropriate, the subsequent judgment by the trial court which held that damages 
against Plaintiffs based on breach of warranty should be reversed. 
Even if the court does not rule on the election of remedy doctrine, then the doctrine 
stated in Christianson v. Idaho Sugar, 590 P.2d 1251, 1253 (Utah 1979), that there must 
be a determination as to when Doms was evicted from the property by one having 
paramount tide, and there has been no such finding or conclusion in this case. Justice Wolf 
indicated that except for nominal damages for a technical breach, the grantee of the land 
cannot recover a covenant against encumbrances until he has been damnified by the breach 
thereof-either suffered a loss titled to the property, or by discharge of an encumbrance. 
Pacific Bond & Mortgage v. Rohou 121 P.2d 635 (Utahl942). 
At the time of the commencement of this action, the tide was vested in Domcoy. 
There is no evidence to indicate that it was evicted from the property. Further, Doms has 
not proven any damages that arose by reason of his ownership of the property. It would 
be ludicrous to say that a person who buys a property with known encumbrances can 
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immediately sue the transferor for the loss of the value in the property by reason of the 
known encumbrances. 
The court should order that the case be dismissed because of Doms' election of 
remedies or because he had not shown any damage. 
POINT VI 
ANDERSON AND SCOTT ARE ENTITLED TO THE BENEFIT 
PROVIDED IN THE CONTRACT. 
The promissory note that is supported by the trust deed provides that Anderson and 
Scott shall have attorney fees for all matters relating to the collection of the amount due and 
the protection of the title. Doms claimed fraud, and Anderson and Scott defended, and the 
claim was eliminated. Attorney fees relating to this defense of tide should be specifically 
awarded. Doms and Domcoy failed to pay the taxes on the property, which resulted in a 
deed which would have eliminated the tide of the plaintiffs and the defendants. Anderson 
and Scott were required to institute an action to void the tax sale. They were successful in 
this action, and they are entided to attorneys fees relating to this matter, and all other 
matters done in defense of the tide. The validity of the promissory note has been 
established and all attacks against it have been defeated, which has caused several appeals. 
Anderson and Scott, are entided to all attorneys fees incurred in the defense of the 
promissory note and/or the trust deed, including the time spent on appeal. It has been well 
established that the note has not been paid, that there is a major balance due, and that the 
note provides for interest on the unpaid installment. (Addendum 3). Anderson and Scott, 
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Plaintiffs, are entitled to a judgment of the amount due under the note, together with 
interest, and attorneys fees incurred in this action, and thereupon a special execution should 
issue requiring the undivided one-half interest in the property, subject to a special execution 
and sold by the Sheriff at an appropriate sale. If a deficiency is obtained as a result of the 
sale, then a judgment should be entered for such deficiency. UCA §78-37-1. If Doms, as 
a result of this action, obtains a judgment, the judgment should indicate it effects only Mrs. 
Anderson, Mrs. Scott and Mr. Scott, and not Dewey Anderson's estate as a claim has not 
been filed against the estate, and a judgment cannot issue against it. 
POINT VII 
SETOFF WAS NOT AVAILABLE TO DOMS. 
The district court, after exarnining the conflicting testimony of two experts, 
determined that the purchasers had been damaged by an amount of money as a result of the 
encumbrances that were on the property. Damages were not known at the time of the 
negotiation for the sale; in fact, Doms knew the existence of the encumbrances prior to 
completing the sale, and therefore it would seem, should have taken this into account in the 
amount of the purchase price he agreed to pay. Nevertheless, the court fixed an amount 
as damages for the existence of the encumbrances. The court had previously found that the 
deed was a separate transaction from the promissory note and trust deed. The deed 
involved four grantors and two grantees, or six persons, whereas the promissory note and 
trust deed only involved four persons. The amounts for consideration involved in each is 
entirely different. As indicated by the decisions of this Court, there has to be an identity 
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of parties before the remedy of setoff is available. The most recent case is West One Bank 
v. Life Insurance Co.. 887 P.2d 880, 882 (Utah App. 1994). The court held that setoff was 
not available as two separate contracts were involved. These contracts did not constitute 
the same transaction. This is identical to the present case. 
This matter was reviewed in the case of Ron Case Roofing v. Blomquist. 
773 P.2d 1392 (Utah 1989), which indicated that if the damages claimed by the defendant 
as a result of a breach are unliquidated, set off is an inappropriate remedy. See also 
DeBrv v. Cascade, 935 P.2d 499, 501 (Utah 1997) (Setoff was not allowed because there 
were two judgments: one was determined by trial, and the other by contract). 
Also, if the court were to allow setoff, it would be difficult to determine what portion 
of that setoff should be applied to the interest of Dewey C. Anderson's estate. The matter 
was again treated by Mark VII Fin. Consultants v. Smedlev, 792 P.2d 130 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990). The court stated: 
We simply hold that the plaintiff and the bank lack the mutuality of obligation 
required for the pleading of setoff. As a general rule, in order to warrant 
setoff, the demands must be mutual and subsisting between the same parties. 
Any judgment for Doms should be revised to indicate that the Defendant Doms is 
entitled to a judgment for damages resulting from encumbrances against Mrs. Anderson, 
Mr. Scott and Mrs. Scott but not as against the Estate of D.C. Anderson as claims against 
it were barred. Plaintiff should have judgment for the amount due on the promissory note, 
together with interest costs and attorneys fees. 
POINT vm 
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THE APPLICATION OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IS A 
DETERMINATIVE ISSUE AND BARRED THE ACTION FOR 
DAMAGES. 
The record is clear that the statute of limitations had expired before the action had 
been appropriately commenced. 
The purchase and sale transaction was closed on March 22, 1982, and the covenant 
against encumbrances arose on that date. An action to recover for breach of contract must 
be within six years. (UCA 78-12-23(2)). The six-year period expired on March 23,1986. 
A default judgment had been entered against Doms and McCoy on January 21, 1988. 
Thereafter, various answers were filed, including the claim by Doms for damages under 
the contract. The dates were confusing, and therefore, Doms filed a compliance agreement 
therein declaring that the effective date of his answer and counterclaim is June 1, 1988. 
The statute of limitations had expired on March 23, 1988. (R. 76-78). The appropriate 
answer and counterclaim was filed on June 15,1988, both items being three months beyond 
the statute of limitations affecting contracts and therefore barred by such statute. An 
appropriate ruling on the matter of the statute of limitation would have precluded the second 
section of the trial and saved both the government and the parties thousands and thousands 
of dollars. If the statute of limitation is not applicable in this case, then the court should 
courageously set forth the reason, thereby creating a signpost for future parties to judge 
their cases. 
Since its timing is such an important factor in the application of the statute of 
limitations, for convenience, the critical dates are illustrated by the graph attached as 
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Addendum 14. The court should find that the statute of limitation barred the action for 
recovery on the contract, and the defendant's case is dismissed. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth in this brief, plaintiffs request that hat portion of the 
judgment of the trial court which denied Doms' claim of rescission and denied Doms' 
attorney fees be affirmed, but that the portion of the trial court's judgment which awarded 
Doms damages based on his counterclaim be reversed, and that the case be remanded to the 
trial court for dismissal of Doms' counterclaim, and entry of judgment in favor of the 
plaintiffs, including an award of all requested attorneys fees. 
DATED this [o_ day of August, 1998. 
Respectfully submitted, 
^ _— ^ " ^ Attorney for Plaintiffs/Appellees/Cross-Appellants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the above and foregoing brief of 
appellees/cross appellants were either hand-delivered or mailed by U.S. mail, first-class 
postage prepaid, this J$_ day of August, 1998, to: 
Larry R. Keller 
KELLER & LUNGREN, LC 
257 TOWERS, Suite 340 
257 East 200 South, suite 10 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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ADDENDA 
Memorandum Decision (Not for publication) Entered November 4, 1994. 
Pertinent Extracts of the Second Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
Trust Deed Note Dated March 10, 1992. 
Trust Deed dated March 10, 1992. 
Corrected Sheriffs Deed dated June 26, 1989. 
Exhibit 78 in which Mrs. And Mrs. McCoy tender of voting rights dated on March 15, 
1966. 
Order Regarding Provisional Attorney's Fees dated July 6, 1988.. 
Plaintiffs Motion to Implement the Decree of the Utah Court of Appeals. 
Memorandum Decision dated April 30, 1996, giving basis for no rescission 
Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as per Memorandum Decision 
of the Court of Appeals dated May 31, 1996. 
Order on Court Minute Entry of May 6, 1997 and dated September 8, 1997. 
Notice of Omissions 
Other issues that may arise by reason of Footnote two (2) of Court of Appeals Decision 
Timeline Graph illustrating the times each particular event occurred. 
Determinative statutes and rules. 
ADDENDA #1. 
ADDENDUM 1 
COVER SHEET 
CASE TITLE: 
Ellen Anderson, as personal 
representative of the Estate of 
D. C. Anderson; Ellen Anderson; 
personally; Dan Scott and Jeanne Scott, 
Plaintiffs, Appellants, 
and Cross-Appellees, 
v. 
Michael R. McCoy; and Eugene E. Poms, 
Defendant, Appellee# 
and Cross-Appellant, 
Ellen Anderson, as personal 
representative of the Estate of 
D. C. Anderson; Ellen Anderson; 
personally; Dan Scott and Jeanne Scott, 
Third-Party Plaintiffs, 
Appellants, and Cross-Appellees, 
v. 
Summit County Title Company, a Utah corporation, 
Third-Party Defendants, 
and Appellees, 
Ellen Anderson, as personal 
representative of the Estate of 
D. C. Anderson; Ellen Anderson; 
personally; Dan Scott and Jeanne Scott, 
Plaintiffs, Appellants, 
and Cross-Appellees, 
v. 
Summit County, a body corporate and 
politic of the State of Utah; and 
Blake L. Frazier, in his official 
capacity as Summit County Auditor; 
Gump £ Ayers Real Estate, Inc., 
a Utah corporation; Victor R. Ayres; 
Domcoy Enterprises, Inc., a Utah 
corporation; Eugene E. Poms; unknown 
defendants described as John Does 
1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, 
Defendants, Appellees, 
and Cross-Appellant* 
November T_, 1994. MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For Publication). 
Opinion of the Court by NORMAN H. JACKSON, Judge; JUDITH 
M. BILLINGS, and PAMELA T. GREENWOOD, Judges, concur. 
m
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Ellen Anderson, as personal representa-
tive of the Estate of D.C. Anderson; 
Ellen Anderson, personally; Dan Scott 
and Jeanne Scott, 
Plaintiffs, Appellants, and 
Cross-Appellees, 
v. 
Michael R. McCoy; and Eugene E. Poms. 
Defendant, Appellee, and 
Cross-Appellant, 
Ellen Anderson, as personal representa-
tive of the Estate of D.C. Anderson; 
Ellen Anderson, personally; Dan Scott 
and Jeanne Scott, 
Third-Party Plaintiffs, Appellants# 
and Cross-Appellees, 
v. 
Summit County Title Company, a Utah 
corporation, 
Third-Party Defendants, and 
Appellees, 
Ellen Anderson, as personal representa-
tive of the Estate of D.C. Anderson; 
Ellen Anderson, personally; Dan Scott 
and Jeanne Scott, 
Plaintiffs, Appellants, and 
Cross-Appellees, 
v. 
Summit County, a body corporate and 
politic of the State of Utah; and Blake 
L. Frazier, in his official capacity as 
Summit County Auditor; Gump £ Ayers Real 
Estate, Inc., a Utah corporation; Victor 
R. Ayres; Domcoy Enterprises, Inc., a 
Utah corporation; Eugene E. Poms: 
unknown defendants described as John 
Does 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, 
Defendants, Appellees, and 
Cross-Appellant. 
riLtzu 
Utah Court of Appeals 
NOV 0 4 i$S* 
Marilyn M. Branch 
Clerk of the Court 
MEMORANDUM 
DECISION 
(Not For 
Publication) 
Case No. 920653-CA 
F I L E D 
(November 4, 1994) 
Third District, Summit County 
The Honorable John A. Rokich 
Attorneys: Irving H. Biele and Curtis C. Nesset, Salt Lake City, 
for Appellant 
Larry R. Keller and Craig L. Boorman, Salt Lake City, 
for Cross-Appellant Eugene Doms 
Before Judges Billings/ Greenwood, and Jackson. 
JACKSON, Judge: 
Appellants raise several challenges to the trial court's 
determination to allow appellee (Doms) to proceed with his 
counterclaim. Appellants' arguments relating to the counterclaim 
include whether the statute of limitations barred the 
counterclaim, whether the counterclaim related back to the date 
appellants filed their foreclosure action, whether the deed Doms 
obtained from Domcoy was valid, whether Doms was the real party 
in interest, whether Doms was a remote grantee, and whether the 
trial court improperly joined involuntary plaintiffs. We agree 
with the trial court's decision to allow Doms to proceed with his 
counterclaim and find appellants' arguments to be without merit. 
Thus, we decline to address them. See State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 
886, 896 (Utah 1989) (court may decline to address arguments 
without merit on appeal). 
In his cross-appeal, Doms asserts that the trial court 
improperly applied the equitable doctrine of laches and refused 
to rescind the Rossi Hills transaction. "To successfully assert 
a laches defense, a defendant must establish both that the 
plaintiff unreasonably delayed in bringing an action and that the 
defendant was prejudiced by that delay." Borland v. Chandler, 
733 P.2d 144, 147 (Utah 1987); accord Papanikolas Brothers Enter, 
v. Sugarhouse Shopping Center Assocs., 535 P.2d 1256, 1260 (Utah 
1975); Utah Dept. of Transp. v. Reagan Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 
751 P.2d 270, 271 (Utah App. 1988) (defendant must establish 
prejudice before laches defense may be successfully asserted); 
see In re Petition of Merrill Cook, 249 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 4 (Utah 
1994) (denying petition because petitioners failed to act with 
reasonable diligence and because relief requested "could work a 
substantial hardship on the State"). 
The trial court made findings concerning Doms's delay in 
bringing the action but made no findings as to whether appellants 
were prejudiced by the delay.1 Therefore, we remand this case to 
1. We note that we do not agree that any time property increases 
or decreases in value, the prejudice prong of the laches defense 
is automatically met. See Child v. Child, 332 P.2d 981, 988 
(Utah 1958) ("natural increment" in value of property does not 
constitute prejudice in laches claim); see also West Los Angeles 
Institute for Cancer Research v. Mayer, 366 F.2d 220, 228 (9th 
Cir. 1966) (mere increase or decrease in property value does not 
(continued...) 
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the trial court for the purpose of entering findings of fact 
relevant to whether appellants were prejudiced by any delays in 
Doms pursuing his counterclaim. If the trial court cannot find 
from the evidence presented that the appellants were prejudiced 
by the delay, the equitable doctrine of laches should not bar the 
remedy of rescission.2 Accordingly, we remand this case to the 
trial court. 
Nor^kn H. Jackson^oudge 
WE CONCUR: 
uudith M. Billings, Judge^ 
reenwood/* Judge 
1. (...continued) 
alone convert delay into laches) ; Fitzgerald v. O'Connell, 386 
A.2d 1384, 1388 (R.I. 1978); (fact that property appreciated does 
not in and of itself convert delay into laches); Lincoln v. 
Fisher. 339 P.2d 1084, 1098 (Or. 1959). 
A change in property value is one factor courts should 
consider in determining prejudice. Lawson v. Hanves. 170 F.2d 
741, 744 (10th Cir. 1948); Filler v. Richland County. 806 P.2d 
537, 540 (Mont. 1991); Jacobson v. Jacobson, 557 P.2d 156, 159 
(Utah 1976). Further, other courts have determined that a change 
in property value did not prejudice landowners because the change 
could be taken into account by a court of equity in fashioning a 
just remedy. Small v. Badenhop, 701 P.2d 647, 658 (Haw. 1985). 
2. Because it is possible that the trial court will order the 
contract rescinded due to lack of evidence in the record 
concerning prejudice, we need not address the other claims 
raised. However, in the event the trial court does not rescind 
the transaction, the trial court should note that its findings 
and conclusions do not adequately treat the effect of the 
intervening conveyances to and from Domcoy on Doms's right to 
v
 pursue his counterclaims and the effect of the default judgment 
entered against McCoy and the sheriff's sale of McCoy's interest 
in Rossi Hills on Doms's ownership interest in the property and 
any damages for breach of title warranties. 
920653-CA 3 
ADDENDA #2. 
ADDENDA 2 
PERTINENT EXTRACTS FROM THE SECOND AMENDED 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. "Plaintiffs in this case, as grantors, conveyed to Defendant Eugene E. Doms and 
one Michael R. McCoy, pursuant to a form Warranty deed . . . " Record 6876. 
2. "Along the westerly boundaries of the lots in Block 58 are encroachments such as 
sheds, fences and decks owned and used by adjoining property owners to the west." Record 
6878. 
3. "The Slipper parcel was purchased by Doms and McCoy to further the integrated 
development of the three parcels and to equalize their position with the developers of the 
Slipper parcel and Block 62. * Record 6882. 
4. "Doms knew or should have known at the time he purchased the Rossie Hills 
Property and the Slipper parcel that the integrated development of the three parcels had failed 
because of the problems with the Rossie Hills property and the inability of the parties to reach 
an agreement as to credits for each parcel." Record 6882. 
5. " Doms walked the Rossie Hills property with Mr. Sloan in the fall of 1981 and 
knew that there were roads and sheds on the property. * Record 6883 
6. "Doms had actual notice of the easement encroachments for the first time sometime 
between October 22, 1981, and November 7, 1981, and had further notice during 1982 and up 
and through 1984." Record 6883. 
7. "It was not until Plaintiffs' action to foreclose was filed that Defendant Doms filed 
his Amended Counterclaim in June of 1988 seeking to rescind the Warranty Deed." Record 
1 
6884. 
8. "Defendant Doms failed to file his claim for damages against the Estate of D.C. 
Anderson within three months after the date of the first publication of Notice to Creditors as 
provided in Section 76-3-803 of the Utah Uniform Probate code." Record 6884. 
9. "The Court finds that purchasers of real estate are not entitled to attorney fees 
absent and express agreement providing therefore, . . . " Record 6885. 
10. "The Court finds the plaintiffs complaint in foreclosure as well as all other actions 
by the plaintiffs were not instituted or prosecuted in bad faith." Record 6885. 
11. "The Court finds that Doms is not entitled to attorney fees." Record 6885 
12. " . . . The Court finds that plaintiffs are entitled to recover attorney fees for the 
time spent on the collection of the Trust Deed Note and the Trust Deed foreclosure action but 
not for any time spent in defending against any of the causes of action in the Second Amended 
Complaint." Record 6886. 
13. "The Court finds the plaintiffs are entitled to attorney fees for legal services 
incurred in the prosecution of the collection of the Note foreclosure action, the motion to set 
aside default, to compel sanctions, setting aside the tax sale, intermediate appeal and petition 
for extraordinary writ to the Utah Supreme Court." Record 6887. 
14. "The loop road, sheds, fences, backyard areas bordered by said fences, and decks 
are encroachments and constitute encumbrances upon the property." Record 6889. 
15. "Said encumbrances existed on the Rossie Hills property on the date of the 
delivery of the Deed, which was March 23, 1982." Record 6889. 
16. "The aforesaid statutory covenants contained in the Warranty Deed were breached 
2 
upon the delivery of the Warranty Deed to Defendant Doms on March 23, 1982. * Record 
6890. 
17. "The Warranty Deed, Trust Deed Note and Trust Deed prepared at the same time 
do not constitute a single contract. * Record 6890. 
18. "The utilization of the Rossie Hills property is adversely affected by the 
encroachments and loop road to the extent that the value of the property is diminished." 
Record 6890. 
19. "The proper measure of damages under Utah law is the difference in the value of 
the property without any encumbrances minus the value of the property with the 
encumbrances." Record 6891. 
20. "Defendant Doms is entitled to an offset against the Two Hundred seventy-six 
Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty Dollars ($276,750.00) purchase price of the property, ..." in 
the amount of Eight Two Thousand, Five Hundred Dollars ($82,500.00) which represents the 
earnest money payment of Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00) and the down payment of 
Seventy-Two Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($72,500.00). Record 6891. 
21. "Defendant Doms is further entitled to an additional offset of Eighty-Three 
Thousand Dollars ($83,000.00), which represents the damages suffered by Defendant Doms as 
a result of the encumbrances on the property as set forth above." Record 6892. 
22. "Inasmuch as Defendant Doms' damages were not determined and a Judgment has 
not been entered for said damages, Plaintiffs' action for a judgment of foreclosure is 
premature. * Record 6891. 
3 
23. "In regard to the issue of whether or not Defendant Doms was entitled to rescind 
the contract, the Court concludes that Defendant doms was bound to take remedial action after 
the Fall of 1981 which the Court determined to be the date he was made aware of the 
encroachments and loop road, and which was prior to the purchase of the Slipper parcel." 
Record 6892. 
24. "Once Defendant Doms knew of the road and the encumbrances, he should have 
taken action within a reasonable time to notify the sellers of his intent to rescind the 
transaction." Record 6893. 
25. "Defendant Doms did not act within a reasonable time after he obtained 
knowledge that the loop road and the encroachments were upon the Rossie Hills property." 
Record 6893. 
26. "The Warranty Deed dated August 26, 1988, in which Domcoy Enterprises, Inc., 
as grantor, conveyed the Rossie Hills Property to Defendant Doms, as grantee, is a valid Deed 
which transferred legal title to Defendant Doms." Record 6894. 
27. "Defendant Doms' Second Amended Counterclaim seeking damages against 
Plaintiff Ellen Anderson as Personal Representative of the Estate of D.C. Anderson is barred 
by the three-month filing period limitation for claims against an estate pursuant to 
Section 75-3-803 of the Utah Uniform Probate Code, as said section relates to the issues of 
damages." Record 6895. 
END 
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ADDENDA #3. 
ADDENDUM 3 
TRUST DEED NOTE 
DO NOT DESTROY THIS NOTE: When paid, fhJs note, with Trust Deed securing same, must be surrendered 
to Trustee for cancellation, before reconveyance will be made. 
I 194,250.00_ P ^ k C i ^ , Utah 
March 10,
 i a 82 
— » *"-
FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the undersigned, jointly and severally, promise to pay to the order of 
D.C. ANDERSON as to an undivided one-half interest and DAN SCOTT as to an 
undivided 1/2 interest 
.....9^„9^M?.J?-^ ITO Hl^^^raTO & NOAGgoLLARS ($..A?.5'250-°?..), 
together with interest from date at the rate of Fr~~'!2^. per cent (•*" * . %) per annum on 
the unpaid principal, said principal and interest payable as follows: 
IWD THOUSAND IWO HUNDRED SIXTY SIX AND 25/100 Dollars ($2,266.25) towards 
interest only on the 10th day of April, 1982, and a like amount to interest 
on the 10th day of each and every month thereafter to and including January 
10, 1985. 
Ihe entire unpaid principal, together with interest is due on January 25, 1985. 
Each payment shall be applied first to accrued interest and the balance to the reduction of principal Any 
such installment not paid when due shall bear interest thereafter at the rate of..~...?S±~;. per 
cent (J.8-.Q.%) per annum until paid. 
If default occurs in the payment of said installments of principal and interest or any part thereof, or in 
the performance of any agreement contained in the Trust Deed securing this note, the holder hereof, at its 
option and without notice or demand, may declare the entire principal balance and accrued interest due and 
payable. 
If this note is collected by an attorney after default in the payment of principal or interest, either with 
or without suit, the undersigned, jointly and severally, agree to pay all costs and expenses of collection including 
a reasonable attorney's fee. 
The makers, sureties, guarantors and endorsers hereof severally waive presentment for payment, demand 
and notice of dishonor and nonpayment of this note, and consent to any and all extensions of time, renewals, 
waivers or modifications that may be granted by the holder hereof with respect to the payment or other pro-
visions of *hi< note, and to the release of any security, or any part thereof, with or without substitution. 
This note is secured by a Trust Deed of even date herewith. 
EUGENEE. DQMS 
at 
733? ] PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT I ' MZ&AEL (r^'r tcOY' 3 I \J 
BLANK NO. 813 C c w no co — 321s so a«oo *AST — *AUT LAKC CITY 
ADDENDA #4. 
ADDENDUM 4 
mz *<>• 4914 
WHEN RECORDED, MAIL TO: 
Space Above This Line For Recorder's Use 
TRUST DEED 
With Assignment of Rents 
THIS TRUST DEED, made this ..A9.!$. day of **?*}. 
between ? ^ A S L 3 . . . £ ! ? ^ &..**&*&..*$. .9°™?*. 
19.. 82 
... as TRUSTOR, 
whose address is 2 8 5 ° °cean P a r I c B l v d . , S u i t e 300, Santa Monica, Ca l i f* , 90405 
(Strwt and number) (City) (Stat*) 
^^.S^^..^^.SPf^ as TRUSTEE,* and 
..P.??:.v.???*ff?f^..?? „ ^ . ^ . u ^ ^ , t t l . ? : > * ^ v l 1 ^ infccraat and QrV? 9COT as to «a 
as BENEFICIARY, 
WITNESSETH: That Trustor CONVEYS AND WARRANTS TO TRUSTEE IN TRUST, 
WITH POWER OF SALE, the following described property, situated in &xx*Lt 
County, State of Utah: 
<v <f 
SMG2L HO. 
ptypm* :*>. 
PAROL NO. 3i 
• ? PIAINTIH-'* 
\ EXHIBIT 
\ --£— 
1 5339, 
All of Lots 17,13,19,20,21,22,23,24,25,26,27,23,29,30,31 
au-^ i 32, DLDCk 5C, I^ arSc City Survey, acoccciing to tha amnied 
plat thaiBCsf, a* filar! and of x*ooxti in tha offloa of the 
ourrlt Couiw/ l^corottr. 
^11 cf iczt 17 *a*uT. 1?, .'lcvfc 3r, ?*d» City *-JT' ', •ryrtling 
fc. ch* i* • *>! Oiit. , , ^ o i \ ;r. r U V Vi ; ^ ' - cor - . 1- the 
•*tJ * ' < *n **}!-*t ^>»---/ •v.w ,«*" '\vx>-.nX-; fV*rvfrcr» 
o^' portion located vdthtn th» railroad rights of %*y ** 
ceocribo'i in tl^c^z oartAin c t e i r w t a rooar\3*d em 2rttry NO. 
317f. in Dock C «t Pnot 401, Entry No. 13316 in Book H & 
Page 326, and firtry NO. 13610 in Book H at P*9« 373, record* 
of SusndLt County, Utah. 
Al l of Lot 18, Block 59, Pmrk City Sonny, according to tha 
fsoffikad PUt tharaof, MM f i lad Mud of rooord In tht off lo* of 
tho Suninit Osunty Fecordar, moBpting tixrafrow any portiao 
located within tha railroad right* of %*y ax daeacibed in 
these certain dacvaoonts raoordod MM Entry HD. 8176 in Book C 
at Pag* 401, Entry No. 15316 in Book E c t Pag* 326, cad Entry 
No. 13610 in Book H at Paga 373, roooxda of Suanit Cbbnty, Utah. 
Together with all buildings, fixtures and improvements thereon and all water rights, rights of 
way, easements, rents, issues*, profits, income, tenements, hereditaments, privileges and appurtenances 
thereunto belonging now or hereafter used or enjoyed with said property, or any part thereof, 
SUBJECT, HOWEVER, to the nght, power and authority hereinafter given to and conferred upon 
Beneficiary to collect and apply such rents, issues, and profits; 
FOR THE PURPOSE OF SECURING (1) payment of the indebtedness evidenced by a pro-
missory note of even date herewith, in the principal <um of S ' . made by 
Trustor, payable to the order of Beneficiary at the times, in the manner and with interest as therein 
set forth, and any extensions and/or renewals or modifications thereof; (2) the performance of 
each agreement of Trustor herein contained; (3) the payment of such additional loans or advances as 
hereafter may he made to Trustor, or his successors or assigns, when evidenced by a promissory 
note or notes reciting that they are secured by this Trust Deed; and (4) the payment of all sums 
expended or advanced by Beneficiary under or pursuant to the terms hereof, together with interest 
thereon as herein provided. 
•NOTE: Trustee must be a mrmhor of the Utah State Bar. a bank, building and loan association or savings 
and loan association authorized to do such business in Utah; a corporation authorized to do a trust business in 
Utah; or a title insurance or abstract company authorized to do such business in Utah. 
15. After the lapse of such t t as may then be required by law following' recordation of said notice of 
default, and notice of default and notice of sale having been given AS then required ^ law. Trustee, without demand 
on Trustor, shall sell said property on the date and at the time and place destgnatsd in **»d notice of sale, either as 
a whole or in separate parcels, and in such order as it may determine (but subject to any statutory right of Trustor to 
direct the order in which such property, if consisting of several known lots or psrcels. shall be sold), at public 
auction to the highest bidder, the purchase price payable in lawful money of the United States at the tune of 
sale. The person conducting the sale may. for any cause he deems expedient, postpone the sale from time to 
time until it shall be completed and. in every case, notice of postponement shall be given by public declaration 
thereof by such person at the time and place last appointed for the sale; provided, if the sale u postponed 
for longer than one day beyond the day designated in the notice of sale, notice thereof shall be given in the 
same manner as the original notice of sale. Trustee shall execute and deliver to the purchaser its Deed con-
veying said property so sold, but without any covenant or warranty, express or implied. The recitals in the 
Deed of any matters or facts shall be conclusive proof of the truthfulness thereof. Any person, including Bene-
ficiary, may bid at the sale. Trustee shall apply the proceeds of the sale to payment of (1) the costs and 
expenses of exercising the power of sale and ol the SMI^. including the payment of the Trus tee s and attorney's 
fees; (2) cost of any evidence of title procured in connection with such sale and revenue stamps on Trustee s Deed; 
(3) all sums expended under the terms hereof, not then repaid, with accrued interest at 10% per annum from date 
of expenditure; (4) all other sums then secured hereby; and (5) the remainder, if any. to the person or persons 
legally entitled thereto, or the Trustee, in its discretion, may deposit the balance of such proceeds with the County 
Clerk of the county in which the sale took place. 
16. Upon the occurrence of any default hereunder. Beneficiary shall have the option to declare all sums 
secured hereby immediately due and payable and fore dose this Trust De^d in the manner provided by law 
for the foreclosure of mortgages on real property and Beneficiary shall be entitled to recover in such proceed-
ing all costs and expenses incident thereto, including a reasonable attorney's fee in such amount as shall be 
fixed by the court. 
17. Beneficiary may appoint a successor trustee at any time by filing for record in the office of the County 
Recorder of each county in which said property or s o m e part thereof is situated, a substitution of trustee. From 
the time the substitution is filed for record, the new trustee shall succeed to all the powers, duties, authority 
and title of the trustee named herein or of any successor trustee. Each such substitution shall be executed and 
acknowledged, and notice thereof shall be given and proof thereof made, in the manner provided by law. 
18. This Trust Deed shall apply to, inure to the benefit of. and bind all parties hereto, their heirs, legatees, 
devisees, adminstrators, executors, successors and assigns. All obligations of Trustor hereunder are joint and 
several. The term "Beneficiary" shall mean the owner and holder, including any pledgee, of the note secured 
hereby. In this Trust Deed, whenever the context requires, the masculine gender includes the feminine and/or 
neuter, and the singular number indudes the plural. 
19. Trustee accepts this Trust when this Trust Deed, duly executed and acknowledged, is made a public 
record as provided by law. Trustee b not obligated to notify any party hereto of pending sale under ttny other 
Trust Deed or of any action or proceeding in which Trustor. Beneficiary, or Trustee shall be a party, unless 
brought by Trustee. 
20. This Trust Deed shall be construed according to the laws of the State of Utah 
21. The undersigned Trustor request* that a copy of any notice of default and of any notice of sale 
hereunder be mailed to him at the address hereinbefore set forth. 
Signature of Trustor 
VXttSF . 
MICR&EL R« 
rctc 
. MnOCY 
(If Trustor an Individual) 
JAH. 
COUNTY OF* 
On the IPtfc day of ?^nd» , A.D. 19...?.?., personally 
STATE OF UT  ) Surmrit 
appeared before me f3vKS*.. . .A..Ui^. .a^
 t 
the signer(s) of the above instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that 5.he.X executed the 
same. 
Notary Public residing at: 
M y C
«2!SSi5,2n E x p i r e s : Sale L*'-2 -Hty, fJtah 
(If Trustor a Corporation) 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF 
On the ... day of
 t A.D. 19 , personally 
appeared before me . , who being by me duly sworn, 
says that he is the of 
the corporation that executed the above and foregoing instrument and that said instrument was 
signed in behalf of said corporation by authority of its by-laws (or by authority of a resolution 
of its board of directors) and said acknowledged 
to me that said corporation executed the same. 
My Commission Expires: 
Notary Public residing at: 
ADDENDA #5. 
ADDENDUM 5 
Ellen Anderson's Address: 
2134 St. Maryfs Way 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84108 
C O R R E C T E D 
S H E R I F F ' S D E E D 
THIS CORRECTED SHERIFF'S DEED AMENDS, MODIFIES AND CORRECTS THAT CERTAIN 
SHERIFF'S DEED DATED JUNE 26, 1989 AND RECORDED ON JULY 7, 1989 AS ENTRY 
NO. 310188, IN BOOK 527, AT PAGES 253 AND 254. 
THIS INDENTURE, made this 26th day of June, 1989, between D. Fred 
Eley, Sheriff/ Summit County, State of Utah, party of the first part, and 
Ellen Anderson as Personal Representative for the Estate of D. C. Anderson, 
Dan Scott, Ellen Anderson personally, and Jeanne Scott, parties of the sec-
ond part. 
WITNESSETH, WHEREAS, in and by a certain judgment and decree made 
and entered by the Third Judicial District, in and for Summit County, of 
the State of Utah on the 20th day of January, 1988, in a certain action 
then pending in said Court, wherein Ellen Anderson as Personal 
Representative for the Estate of D. C. Anderson, Dan Scott, Ellen Anderson 
personally, and Jeanne Scott, Plaintiffs, and Michael R. McCoy and Eugene 
E. Doms, Defendants, was among other things ordered and adjudged that all 
and singular all the right, title and interest of Michael R. McCoy in and 
to the premises in said judgment and hereinafter described should be sold 
at public auction, by and under the direction of the Sheriff of Summit 
County, State of Utah, in the manner required by law; that either of the 
parties to said action might become purchaser at such sale, and that said 
Sheriff should execute the usual certificates and deeds to the purchaser as 
required by law; and 
WHEREAS, the Sheriff did, at the hour of 11:00 a.m., on the 12th 
day of December, 1988, at the County Courthouse in the City of Coalville, 
County of Summit, State of Utah, after due public notice had been given, as 
required by law and said judgment, duly sell at public auction, agreeable 
to law and said judgment, all of the right, title and interest of Michael 
R. McCoy in and to the premises and property in said judgment and hereinaf-
ter described at which sale said premises and property were fairly struck 
off and sold to Ellen Anderson as Personal Representative for the Estate of 
D. C. Anderson, Dan Scott, Ellen Anderson personally, and Jeanne Scott, for 
the sum of ONE THOUSAND DOLLARS it being highest bidder and that being the 
highest sum bid at said sale; and 
WHEREAS, said Ellen Anderson as Personal Representative for the 
Estate of D. C. Anderson, Dan Scott, Ellen Anderson personally, and Jeanne 
Scott, paid to said Sheriff said sum of money so bid, and said Sheriff 
thereupon made and issued the usual certificate in duplicate of such sale 
in due form, and delivered one thereof to said purchaser, and caused the 
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other to be filed in the office of the County Recorder, County of Summit, 
State of Utah. 
NOW TS INDENTURE WITNESSES, that the said party of the first 
part, Sheriff aforesaid, in order to carry into effect said sale in pursu-
ance of said judgment and of the law, and also in consideration of the 
premises and of the money so bid and paid by the said Ellen Anderson as 
Personal Representative for the Estate of D. C. Anderson, Dan Scott, Ellen 
Anderson personally, and Jeanne Scott, the receipt whereof is hereby 
acknowledged, has granted, sold, conveyed, and by these presents does 
grant, sell and convey, and confirm unto the said party of the second part, 
its successors and assigns forever, all of the right, title and interest of 
Michael R. McCoy in and to the following described real estate forever, the 
following real estate lying and being in Summit County, State of Utah, 
being all right, title, claim and interest of the above named defendants 
of, in and to the following described property to-wit: 
Parcel No. 1: 
All of Lots 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 
28, 29, 30, 31, and 32, Block 58, Park City Survey, 
according to the amended plat thereof, as filed and of 
record in the office of the Summit County Recorder. 
Parcel No. 2: 
All of Lots 17 and 19, Block 59, Park City Survey, 
according to the amended plat thereof, as filed and of 
record in the office of the Summit County Recorder, 
excepting therefrom any portion located within the rail-
road rights-of-way as described in those certain docu-
ments recorded as Entry No. 8176 in Book C at Page 401, 
Entry No. 13 316 in Book H at Page 326, and Entry No. 
13610 in Book H at Page 373, records of Summit County, 
Utah. 
Parcel No. 3: 
All of Lot 18, Block 59, Park City Survey, according to 
the Amended Plat thereof, as filed and of record in the 
office of the Summit County Recorder, excepting there-
from any portion located within the railroad rights of 
way as described in those certain documents recorded as 
Entry No. 8176 in Book C at Page 401, Entry No. 13316 in 
Book H at Page 326, and Entry No. 13610 in Book H at 
Page 373, records of Summit County, Utah. 
TOGETHER WITH an easement for utilities, including sewer 
and water lines over and southerly five feet and 
northerly five feet of the following described lots: 
All of Lot 14, the South Half of Lot 15, Block 58, 
Park City Survey, according to the amended plat 
thereof as filed and of record in the office of the 
Summit County Recorder, Coalville, Utah. 
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The above described real property is located in Park 
City, Summit County, Utah. 
TOGETHER WITH all and singular the tenements, hereditaments and 
appurtenances thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining, to have and 
to hold the same unto said party of the second part, his heirs and assigns 
forever. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, said party of the first part has hereunto set 
his hand and seal the day and year firsjt-^ above j^ rifcter 
STATE OF UTAH 
Cc ty of Summit 
) ss, 
) 
On the 26th day of June, 1989, before me, LINDA SMITH, a Notary 
Public in and for the County of Summit, State of Utah, personally appeared 
D. FRED ELEY, Sheriff of Summit County, State of Utah, personally known to 
me to be the person described in and who executed the foregoing instrument 
who acknowledged to me that he executed the same as such Sheriff, freely 
and voluntarily, and for the uses and purposes therein mentioned. 
WITNESSED my hand notarial seal, this 26th day of June, 1989. 
fing in Hen^fer, Otah 
• ion Expires: July 15, 1991 
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ADDENDA #6. 
ADDENDUM 6 ffittlPlf 1$ 
March 15, 1985 
Mr. Eugene E. Doms 
Domcoy Enterprises Inc. 
23276 South Pointe Dr. 
Suite 204 
Laguna Hills, CA 92653 
Dear Gene, 
Pursuant to our discussion and verbal agreement, I hereby irrevocably tender to 
you all voting rights for all my shares of stock In Domcoy Enterprises Inc, a Utah 
corporation. I willingly take this measure to ratify the Indemnification 
agreement I exercised in your favor in the lawsuit commonly known as Park City 
Investors I v. Cen Corp., et al ( or Park Avenue Central). 
This revocation of my voting rights is to allow you to freely make those business 
decisions necessary to insure the continuity and viability of Domcoy as a 
business entity in light of my current legal and business situation. 
This agreement will continue until you and I mutually agree to the return of my 
stock voting rights. 
Very Truly Yours, 
cc: Gerald H. Kinghom, Esq. 
March 15, 1985 
Mr. Eugene L Doms 
23276 South Pointe Dr. 
Suite 204 
Laguna Hills, CA 92653 
Dear Gene, 
In order to show my support of the business decisions of my husband, Michael 
R. McCoy, and per his request, I irrevocably tender my stock voting rights to 
you under the same terms as outlined in Michael's letter of March 15, 1985 in 
regards to this matter. 
Very Truly Yours, 
Marguerite McCoy 
cc: Gerald H. Klnghorn 
attch. 
witmmmLmmmm*«• nn.it » M X U I * *.»~-». - ^ • I lfc^BB.11 H I T * * 
MICHAEL A. MoCOY 
TAX AND REAL ESTATE ATTORNEY 
28029 OOnOTHV DANE . SUTE 102 • AQOUU WAS. CA 91301 
Eugene E. Doms 
PO Box 3614 
Miss ion V i e j o , CA 92690 
— W i f m tmm im ••»•'*• » » 
ADDENDA #7. 
ADDENDUM 7 
MD. 
F I L E D 
LARRY R. KELLER, #1785 
Attorney for Defendant Doms 
257 Towers, Suite 340 
257 East 200 South - 10 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7282 
*'.&(*• zt iunrr:r .^ourtTy 
GY WW 
Deputy Clerk 
S*" 
THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
ELLEN ANDERSON as Personal 
Representative of the Estate 
Of C D . ANDERSON, ELLEN 
ANDERSON personally, DAN 
SCOTT and JEAN SCOTT, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
MICHAEL R. MCCOY and 
EUGENE E. DOMS, 
Defendants• 
ORDER REGARDING 
PROVISIONAL ATTORNEY'S 
FEES 
Case No. 8339 
Judge Pat B. Brian 
-ooOoo-
The above-entitled matter came before the Court on 
Defendant Doms' objection to the Order proposed by Plaintiff 
setting aside Default Judgment and the award of attorney's 
fees in the matter. Plaintiff was represented by Irving H. 
Biehle, Esq. and Defendant Doms was represented by Larry R. 
Keller, Esq. 
s*rf~i ^ « * 000245 
After hearing argument of counsel and receiving pleadings 
and memoranda of counsel on the issue as to whether or not it 
was appropriate for the Court to have awarded all of the 
attorney's fees incurred by counsel from the on set of the 
case to the date of setting aside the Default Judgment, the 
Court orders that the matter shall be taken under advisement 
and considered anew once the case itself is finally disposed 
of on the merits. 
Furthermore, the Court denies Defendant Doms1 Motion to 
impound the sum of $4,467.00 paid by Defendant Doms1 to 
Plaintiffs' counsel as a condition of setting aside the 
Default Judgment on June 1, 1988. The court finds that 
because this sum has already been paid, that it would be 
inappropriate for the Court to now impound it as requested by 
Defendant Domsf counsel, but once again orders that whether or 
not it was appropriate for the Court to award that sum as 
attorney's fees for setting aside the Default Judgment is an 
issue which will be reserved until the final disposition of 
the case on its merits. 
DATED this 5^ day of lj- '^ ,/^/> , 1988. 
/ BY THE COURT: 
HtfN. PAT B. BR! 
Third District Court 
- 2 -
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Order, first class postage prepaid, this day 
of June, 1988 to Irving H. Biehle, Attorney for Plaintiffs, 50 
West Broadway, Fourth Floor, Salt Lake City, UT 84101. 
JlLUr) djuwk 
- 3 -
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ADDENDA #8. 
ADDENDUM 8 Ibt'd *fafc & ^36 ?m 
IRVING H. BJJELE, USB #A0317 
CURTIS C. NESSET, USB #4238 
NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
333 North 300 West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
Telephone: (801) 328-2506 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR 
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ELLEN ANDERSON, as Personal 
Representative of the Estate of 
D. C. Anderson, DAN SCOTT, 
ELLEN ANDERSON, personally, 
and JEANNE SCOTT, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
EUGENE E. POMS and 
MICHAEL R. McCOY, 
Defendants. 
The Not For Publication Memorandum Decision of the Utah Court of Appeals leaves 
many issues that require further determination by the trial court. Some of those issues include: 
1. This Court must address and make findings on the effect of the intervening 
conveyances and determine whether rescission is even possible or whether the intervening 
conveyances constitute a waiver of either the right to rescission and/or damages. 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO 
IMPLEMENT THE DECISION OF 
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ON REMAND 
Case No. 8339 
2. This Court must also address and determine the effect of the conveyance by Mr. 
McCoy of his one-half interest in a trust deed and the further effect of the foreclosure on that 
interest by an appropriate coun judgment which resulted in a sheriffs sale of the interest. 
3. The court must review and either revise or excise its findings and judgment that 
title was quieted in Mr. Doms since such a judgment conflicts with: 
a. The prior coun order selling Mr. McCoy's one-half interest in the 
property; and, 
b. The interest of the purchasers at the sheriffs sale. 
4. If the coun should determine that the transaction should be rescinded then it must 
also determine: 
a. Whether a one-half interest in a real estate transaction can be rescinded. 
b. Whether the panies can be placed in the same positions which they 
occupied prior to the transaction. 
c. If the rescission must be as to the total contract, then what kind of consent 
must be obtained from the estate of D. C. Anderson and how the final judgment against 
Michael McCoy will be vacated. 
d. How much money Mr. Doms is entitled to recover if the court adopts 
rescission. Mr. Doms is certainly not entitled to recover payments made by Mr. McCoy 
or payments made by Domcoy Enterprises, Inc., because to credit him with such 
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payments would constitute unjust enrichment and give him a judgment or credit for 
moneys paid by other persons or entities. 
e. Whether prejudice exists which would prohibit rescission. -Such prejudice 
was created by the great lapse of time and/or other events that transpired and the death 
of D. C. Anderson. 
5. The court must find specific damages, if any, that result from the violation of the 
known encumbrances and how those violations affect the undivided one-half interest of Mr. 
Doms. 
6. The court must review the method of foreclosure if rescission is not granted since 
if there is a variation from the statutory provisions relating to foreclosure, the court must make 
findings and conclusions that support the new foreclosure proceedings which are not provided 
in the law. 
7. Additional evidence and argument are required in relation to the attorney fees 
involved in the foreclosure and the appeal in this matter in order to give affect to the contract 
provisions both in the trust deed note and the trust deed requiring payment of attorney fees. 
CONCLUSION 
All of the problems created or noted by the court of appeals indicate the desirability of 
a conference with the judge and the attorneys to establish priorities and methodologies and a 
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schedule for proceeding in order to comply with the "Not For Publication Memorandum 
Decision" of the Utah Court of Appeals. 
RespectfiiUy submitted this <~ ' day of August, 1995. 
NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT 
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ADDENDA #9. 
ADDENDUM 9 
APri o t 1996 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ELLEN ANDERSON, as Personal : MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Representative of the Estate 
of D.C. Anderson, DAN SCOTT, : 
ELLEN ANDERSON, personally, 
and JEANNE SCOTT, : 
Plaintiffs, : CASE NO. 8339 
vs. : 
EUGENE E. DOMS and : 
MICHAEL R. MCCOY, 
Defendants. 
In response to the Appellate Court's directive that this Court 
make additional findings of fact relevant to whether the appellant 
was prejudiced by Doms pursuing his Counterclaim for rescission, 
this Court submits the following. 
In order to properly address the issue raised by the Appellate 
Court, the Court reviewed its trial notes and the Memoranda 
submitted by counsel. After reviewing the detailed notes the Court 
kept of the trial, this Court has concluded that Doms did not have 
grounds to rescind the contract; therefore, the issue of laches 
would be moot. 
The findings of fact heretofore made by this Court found that 
Doms had familiarized himself with the property, knew of the 
encroachments, the loop road and that Anderson's property 
ANDERSON V. DOMS PAGE TWO MEMORANDUM DECISION 
development could be enhanced if developed with two other adjoining 
parcels, Doms proceeded to try and develop the property even 
though he had no experience in developing real estate and was 
unfamiliar with land development in the Park City area. 
It was evident to the Court that Doms was motivated by the 
lure of a quick profit and did not take the time or make the effort 
to make a sound economic evaluation for the development of the 
property. 
Doms7 motivation caused him to purchase an interest in the 
slipper parcel so that an integrated development could take place. 
However, he was unsuccessful in obtaining the third parcel which 
would have made the project more feasible and profitable. 
It is interesting to note that Doms did not raise the issue of 
rescission at the time of the conveyance from him and McCoy to 
Dancoy Enterprises or at the time the dissolved corporation, 
Dancoy, conveyed the property to Doms, The actions and conduct of 
Doms indicated that he wanted to own the Anderson parcel despite 
the encroachments and prescriptive easement and not rescind the 
transaction. 
This Court found that Doms did not have the grounds for 
rescission based upon fraud or negligent misrepresentation. 
Plaintiffs had not made representations which were false or that 
ANDERSON V. DOMS PAGE THREE MEMORANDUM DECISION 
would have induced Doms to enter into the transaction to his injury 
and damage. Furthermore, there was no showing that the plaintiffs 
were in a superior position and negligently made false 
representations about the property which they could expect Doms to 
rely and act thereon. 
This Court now concludes that when Doms realized he did not 
have the experience to develop the property, that he was in over 
his head in the transaction, and when the bottom fell out of the 
real estate market in Park City, he sought to rescind, which was an 
unavailable remedy in this Court's opinion. In other words, Doms 
was suffering from buyer's remorse and trying to find a way out by 
trying to rescind. 
If the Appellate Court determines that rescission was an 
available remedy for Doms, this Court then makes the following 
findings of fact relevant to whether the appellants were prejudiced 
by Doms' delay in seeking to rescind after more than five years 
elapsed from the time he knew or should have known that there were 
problems with the Anderson parcel. 
The plaintiffs were substantially damaged by Doms' delay in 
initiating an action to rescind for the following reasons. 
1. Doms had the use and benefit of the property to the 
exclusion of the plaintiffs. He purchased the slipper parcel and 
ANDERSON V. DOMS PAGE FOUR MEMORANDUM DECISION 
attempted to formulate a plan for a three parcel integrated 
development, but was unsuccessful. The plaintiffs are now 
foreclosed from developing an integrated development because Doms 
has an interest in the slipper parcel and the likelihood of Doms 
cooperating with the plaintiffs in an integrated development is 
remote. 
2. Doms failed to pay the property taxes for the years 1982, 
1983, 1984, 1985 and 1986, which resulted in a tax sale and 
required the plaintiffs to initiate legal action to clear the 
title. 
3* D.C. Anderson, one of the principals in the transaction, 
died while Doms was in possession of the property, thus making it 
impossible to elicit testimony from the decedent. 
4. Doms' delay of five years before he sought to rescind the 
transaction adversely affected the plaintiffs' opportunity to 
resolve the encroachment and easement problems because witnesses 
would be unavailable and memories are dimmed by the lapse of time. 
5. During the time that Doms, was in possession of the 
property, the property suffered a 50% reduction in its value. 
6. Doms7 inexperience in developing property or inability to 
sell the property impacted the plaintiffs greatly because of 
ANDERSON V. DOMS PAGE FIVE MEMORANDUM DECISION 
down turn in the real estate market and the increased costs to 
develop the property if they chose to do so. 
7. Doms should not benefit from his poor decisions at the 
expense of the plaintiffs. To allow that to happen would be 
inequitable. 
8. Doms was in default; therefore, could not invoke the 
doctrine of rescission. 
This Court concluded that Doms did not have the grounds for 
rescission but if he did, he failed to rescind timely. 
The Court read the cases cited by counsel for Doms pertaining 
to rescission. Those cases are distinguishable from this case 
because those cases dealt with conditions which allowed rescission 
to take place if the conditions were not satisfied. In this case 
there were no conditions attached to the sale of the property which 
would allow Doms to rescind. In the cases cited there was only 
passive action on the part of the parties. In this case, Doms took 
charge and took steps to develop the property. He engaged an 
attorney to represent him, hired a surveyor, acquired the slipper 
parcel and proceeded to develop the property. 
Mr. Biele shall prepare the Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law in accordance with this Memorandum Decision. He may also 
ANDERSON V. DOMS PAGE SIX MEMORANDUM DECISION 
incorporate those Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law found in 
his supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
Dated this cQ b day of April, 1996. 
Q.,j ^ A /7 
JQJiN k. ROKICH 
SENIOR DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
ANDERSON V. DOMS PAGE SEVEN MEMORANDUM DECISION 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Memorandum Decision, to the following, this <^(o day of 
April, 1996: 
Irving H. Biele 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
33 3 North 300 West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
James A. Mcintosh 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
1399 South 700 East, Suite 17 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105 
Larry R. Keller 
Attorney for Defendant 
257 East 200 South-10, Suite 340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
ADDENDA #10. 
ADDENDUM 1 0 
JUN 0 5 1996 
IRVING H. BIELE, USB #A0317 
NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT 
333 North 300 West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
Telephone: (801) 328-2506 
JAMES A McINTOSH, USB #2194 
JAMES A. McINTOSH & ASSOCIATES P.C. 
1399 South 700 East, Suite 17, Intrade Bldg. South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105 
Telephone: (801) 487-7834 
Co-Counsel for Plaintiffs 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR 
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ELLEN ANDERSON, as Personal 
Representative of the Estate of 
D. C. Anderson, DAN SCOTT, ] 
ELLEN ANDERSON, personally, ] 
and JEANNE SCOTT, ] 
Plaintiffs, ] 
vs. ] 
EUGENE E. POMS and ] 
MICHAEL R. McCOY, ] 
Defendants. ] 
) SUPPLEMENTAL FINDINGS OF FACT 
> AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
) AS PER THE MEMORANDUM DECISION 
> OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
> Case No. 8339 
\ Judge John A. Rokich 
From the evidence and law adduced at trial of this case, the Court makes the following 
Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
PUDDiSma COURT 
Third Judicial District 
JUN 0 4 1996 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
By 
SUPPLEMENTAL FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The real estate transaction between the plaintiffs and the defendants relating to the 
Rossi Hills Property in Summit County, State of Utah, was an arms-length transaction conducted 
in good faith and wherein the Defendant Doms had full knowledge of the encumbrances (Second 
Amended Findings of Fact #41 and #43) and as heretofore found there was no fraud or 
misrepresentation involved in the sale. 
2. Doms determined that the property value could be enhanced if it was developed 
with two other adjoining parcels and purchased an interest in one of the adjoining parcels, 
slipper parcel, so that an integrated development could take place and he proceeded to try to 
develop the properties even though he had no experience in that area. 
3. Doms did not raise the issue of rescission at the time of the conveyance from him 
and McCoy to Domcoy Enterprises, Inc. on August 30, 1983. (See Ex. 16), nor did he raise 
the issue of rescission when he requested and obtained a warranty deed to the property from 
Domcoy on August 20, 1988. Doms' actions and conduct indicated he wanted to own the subject 
property despite the encroachments and prescriptive easements and did not act to rescind the 
transaction. 
4. The findings of fact heretofore made by this Court found that Doms had 
familiarized himself with the property, knew of the encroachments, the loop road and that 
Anderson's property development could be enhanced if developed with two other adjoining 
parcels. Doms proceeded to try and develop the property even though he had no experience in 
developing real estate and was unfamiliar with land development in the Park City area. 
2 
5. It was evident to the Court that Doms was motivated by the lure of a quick profit 
and did not take the time or make the effort to make a sound economic evaluation for the 
development of the property. 
6. Doms' motivation caused him to purchase an interest in the slipper parcel so that 
an integrated development could take place. However, he was unsuccessful in obtaining the 
third parcel which would have made the project more feasible and profitable. 
1. The Defendant Doms' claim for rescission was based on two theories, the first 
being stated in the first cause of action of the Counterclaim which claimed a violation of the 
covenants against encumbrances as the same were contained in the warranty deed; and the 
second claim was contained in die third cause of action which claimed rescission based on fraud. 
(See Second Amended Counterclaim). 
a. In relation to the first cause of action, the court found that all the 
preliminary documents were merged into the warranty deed (Second Amended Findings 
of Fact #54 and Second Amended Conclusions of Law #7) and the doctrine of Berestrom 
v. Moore, 677 P.2d 1123 (Utah 1984) did not apply as this was an executed contract 
rather than an executory contract as existed in Bergstrom v. Moore. Mavnard v. 
Wharton. 284 Utah Adv. Rep. 35, (Utah Ct. App. February 23, 1996) citing other Utah 
Appellate Court Decisions, some of which were discussed by this Court in its Second 
Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
b. The Defendant Doms abandoned his claim for fraud and misrepresentation 
as set forth in the third cause of action of the counterclaim and the court concluded that 
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there was no fraud or negligent misrepresentation in this matter. Plaintiffs had not made 
representations which were false or that would have induced Doms to enter into the 
transaction to his injury and damage. Furthermore, there was no showing that the 
plaintiffs were in a superior position and negligently made false reprsentations about the 
property which they could expect Doms to rely and act thereon. (Second Amended 
Conclusion of Law #41) 
8. During March 1982 the Deed, Note and Trust Deed were all signed, delivered 
and recorded (Exhibits #1 and #3). The purchase price was paid by cash and the execution of 
the Promissory Note. 
9. The defendants entered into possession of the real estate and commenced 
negotiations for a three-parcel integrated development with adjoining property owners (Second 
Amended Findings of Fact #46 and Exhibits #81 and #82). 
10. The first offer for rescission by either of the defendant parties was made by Doms 
through the filing of his second amended counterclaim on or about June, 1988, which was more 
than six (6) years after the completion of the purchase agreement and after he obtained 
knowledge of the claimed defects (R. 6882-3 and Second Amended Finding of Fact #43). The 
Court found and now finds that this is a grossly unreasonable delay in requesting rescission 
(Second Amended Conclusions of Law No's. 33, 35, 39, 40) for the following reasons: 
a. Doms had the use and benefit of the property to the exclusion of the plaintiffs. 
He purchased the slipper parcel and attempted to formulate a plan for a three-parcel 
integrated development, but was unsuccessful. The plaintiffs are now foreclosed from 
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developing an integrated development because Doms has an interest in the slipper parcel 
and the likelihood of Doms cooperating with the plaintiffs in an integrated development 
is remote. 
b. Doms failed to pay the property taxes for the years 1982, 1983, 1984, 
1985 and 1986, which resulted in a tax sale and required the plaintiffs to initiate legal 
action to clear the title. 
c. D. C. Anderson, one of the principals in the transaction, died while Doms 
was in possession of the property, thus making it impossible to elicit testimony from the 
decedent. 
d. Doms' delay of more than six (6) years before he sought to rescind the 
transaction adversely affected the plaintiffs' opportunity to resolve the encroachment and 
easement problems because witnesses would be unavailable and memories are dimmed 
by the lapse of time. 
e. During the time that Doms, Domcoy Enterprises, Inc. and Summit County 
were in possession of the property, the property suffered a 50% reduction in its value. 
f. Doms' inexperience in developing property or inability to sell the property 
impacted the plaintiffs greatly because of down turn in the real estate market and the 
increased costs to develop the property if they chose to do so. 
g. Doms should not benefit from his poor decisions at the expense of the 
plaintiffs. To allow that to happen would be inequitable. 
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h. Doms was in default; therefore, could not invoke the doctrine of 
rescission. 
11. On August 30, 1983, the defendants and each of them, by warranty deed, 
conveyed the Rossi Hills Property to a corporation named Domcoy Enterprises, Inc. (Exhibits 
81 and 82) If Doms is claiming that this deed conveyed all of Mr. McCoy's interest so that it 
was not subject to foreclosure, then it also conveyed all of Doms' interest and he would have 
no basis for rescission or enforcement of plaintiffs' March 10, 1982 warranty deed to him and 
Mr. McCoy. 
12. Neither of the defendants had title or color of title to the subject premises between 
August 30, 1983, when they deeded the premises to the corporation, until August 20, 1988, 
when the dissolved corporation, Domcoy Enterprises, Inc., delivered a conveyance of the subject 
Property to Mr. Doms. (Exhibit 12). 
13- The trust deed required the defendants and each of them to pay the accruing taxes 
on the Property (Exhibit 2) and the defendants failed to pay the taxes for the years 1982, 1983, 
1984, 1985 and 1986. 
14. The defendants and each of them were in substantial default under the provisions 
of the Trust Deed as they failed to pay the required real estate taxes which resulted in the sale 
of the Property to Summit County on May 27, 1987 (Notice of Final Tax Sale - Exhibit 5 to 
Complaint in consolidated case #10066). 
15. Subsequent to the said tax sale on May 27, 1987, Summit County, as a body 
corporate and politic of the State of Utah, held the fee simple title to the Rossi Hill Property 
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until on or about August 24, 1988. See §59-2-1357, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, 
which was in effect at the time of the said tax sale and the Utah Supreme Court case of Hanson 
v. Burns, 46 P.2d 400, 403, 406 (Utah 1935). 
16. The result of a valid Auditor's Deed conveying the fee simple title to the Rossi 
Hill Property to Summit County, would cause the security represented by the Trust Deed to be 
extinguished. See Hanson v. Burns, 46 P.2d 400, 403, 406 (Utah 1935). Therefore, plaintiffs, 
in order to protect their security interests, were required to institute an action against Summit 
County to set aside the Auditor's Tax Deed. This court found the sale to be unconstitutional and 
therefore plaintiffs' Trust Deed was reinstated. (Consolidated Case #10066 and Exhibit 5 to the 
Complaint in such consolidated case.) 
17. Defendant Michael R. McCoy defaulted in this case, a judgment was entered 
against him (R. 34-40; R. 572,3) and in accordance with said judgment, his undivided one-half 
interest was sold at sheriffs sale as per the Certificate of Sale which is attached hereto. There 
is no evidence that Doms made any attempt to redeem the property at any time subsequent to 
said sheriffs sale, nor did the said defendant, Michael R. McCoy, join in the actions for 
rescission or tender his interest in the subject real estate. Under these circumstances McCoy's 
former interest in the property could not be conveyed to the plaintiffs in any attempted rescission 
by Doms, 
18. The defendants and each of them were in default as the payments required by the 
Promissory Note to be made after September, 1984, were not paid (Exhibit 6), nor were the 
taxes paid. 
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19. One of the grantors. Mr. D. C. Anderson, died in Salt Lake City, Utah on 
September 20, 1983, making it impossible to elicit testimony from him. Mr. Anderson's estate 
was duly probated and his wife, Ellen R. Anderson, was duly appointed personal representative 
of his estate and has been acting as such since November 30, 1983. Neither of the defendants 
filed a claim for either damages or rescission against the estate. (R. 7988) 
20. From August 30, 1983 (when Doms and McCoy conveyed their title in the 
property to Domcoy) through the date of the tax sale on May 27, 1987 (when Summit County 
acquired fee simple title to the property) the corporation, Domcoy Enterprises, Inc., was the sole 
owner of the Rossi Hills Property having acquired title thereto subject to the trust deed, by 
reason of a warranty deed from both defendants to it dated August 30, 1983. (Exhibits 81 and 
82). The Defendant Doms did not reacquire any interest in Rossi Hills Property until August 
20, 1988, when the dissolved corporation, Domcoy, delivered a conveyance to Mr. Doms. 
(Exhibit 17) 
21. During the time that Doms, Domcoy Enterprises, and Summit County had title 
to the property, the property suffered a 50% reduction in its value. 
22. At no time, by pleading or otherwise, did the Defendant Doms or any other party 
owning an interest in the Rossi Hills Property make a legally sufficient tender the same to the 
plaintiffs. 
23. The March 10, 1982 deed from plaintiffs to the defendants and involving the Rossi 
Hills Property created a fully integrated contract involving two grantees or purchasers, each of 
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whom acquired an undivided one-half interest. (Exhibit 1, Second Amended Findings of Fact 
#54, and Second Amended Conclusions of Law #7.) 
SUPPLEMENTAL CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Doctrine of Rescission was not available to the defendant and counterclaimant 
Doms for the following reasons: 
a. The Defendant Doms obtained only an undivided one-half interest in the 
Rossi Hills Property by reason of the March 10, 1982 deed (Exhibit 1) and a joint action 
by all co-owners is required in order to repudiate or rescind the contract. 
b. The default of the defendants in failing to pay accruing taxes and to 
continue the payments required by the contract constiuited substantial defaults and a 
person in default cannot invoke the doctrine of rescission or repudiation. 
c. In order to rescind, it must be possible to return all parties to the status 
quo and this is not now possible because: 
L no claim for either damages, rescission, or other relief was made 
against the estate of D. C. Anderson and it cannot be required to regurgitate 
payments made to it; 
ii. the defendant/co-owner Michael McCoy's undivided one-half 
interest has been sold at sheriffs sale and is not available to return the parties to 
the status quo; and, 
iii. Doms, being motivated by the lure of a quick profit, did not take 
time to make a sound evaluation for the development of the property. 
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It would be inequitable to allow Doms to rescind under these circumstances. 
d. The Defendants had no right, title or interest in and to the real estate 
subsequent to August 30, 1983, when they conveyed the Rossi Hills Property to Domcoy 
Enterprises, Inc. or prior to August 20, 1988, when the dissolved corporation attempted 
to convey the Property to Mr. Doms. This constitutes the entire pleading stage of the 
action and since the defendants during that period had no interest in the Rossi Hills 
Property, they could not tender the same to the plaintiffs. 
e. Since all prior Uniform Real Estate Contracts and representations were 
merged into the final document, the March 10, 1982 deed, (Second Amended Finding 
of Fact #54) this is a fully executed contract and the doctrine of rescission espoused in 
Bergstrom v. Moore, 677 P.2d 1123 (Utah 1984) is not applicable since that case 
pertains only to executory contracts where the sale documents are still in escrow and 
have not been delivered or recorded and the purchase price has not been paid (Second 
Amended Conclusions of Law #7 and #11). 
f. Doms did not have the grounds for rescission based upon fraud or 
negligent misrepresentation. Plaintiffs had not made representations which were false 
or that would have induced Doms to enter into the transaction to his injury and damage. 
Furthermore, there was no showing that the plaintiffs were in a superior position and 
negligently made false representations about the property which they could expect Doms 
to rely and act thereon. 
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g. It was evident to the Court that Doms was motivated by the lure of a quick 
profit and did not take the time or make the effort to make a sound economic evaluation 
for the development of the property. 
h. Doms' motivation caused him to purchase an interest in the slipper parcel 
so that an integrated development could take place. However, he was unsuccessful in 
obtaining the third parcel which would have made the project more feasible and 
profitable. 
i. This Court now concludes that when Doms realized he did not have the 
experience to develop the property, that he was in over his head in the transaction, and 
when the bottom fell out of the real estate market in Park City, he sought to rescind, 
which was an unavailable remedy in this Court's opinion. In other words, Doms was 
suffering from buyer's remorse and trying to find a way out by trying to rescind. 
2. The plaintiffs were substantially prejudiced as a result of: 
a. The failure to pay the real estate taxes for the years 1982, 1983, 1984, 
1985 and 1986, caused Summit County, a body corporate and politic, of the State of 
Utah, to hold a tax sale on May 27, 1987 and since no one made a bid on the Property 
at such sale, an Auditor's Tax Deed conveying the fee simple title to the Rossi Hills 
Property in Summit County was executed which if valid would have eliminated all right, 
title and interest of the plaintiffs in and to the Property, Hanson v. Burris, 46 P.2d 400, 
403, 406 (Utah 1935). 
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b. The failure to pay real estate taxes which resulted in a tax sale of the 
subject Property to Summit County required plaintiffs to institute an action against 
Summit County to declare that the Auditor's Tax Deed conveying fee simple title to the 
Rossi Hill Property to Summit County was void thereby reinstating the plaintiffs' Trust 
Deed which required the expenditure of substantial sums by the plaintiffs. (Second 
Amended Findings of Fact, #42 and #43) 
c. Doms, Domcoy, and Summit County for over six (6) years (March 10, 
1982 - August 26, 1988) had the use and benefit of the property to the exclusion of the 
plaintiffs, changed the condition of the property in relation to adjacent properties and 
foreclosed the plaintiffs from taking any prompt corrective action in relation to 
encumbrances. 
d. The death of D. C. Anderson and the failure to file any claim against his 
estate made it impossible to elicit his testimony in relation to the terms and conditions 
of the sale or to require his estate to participate in any judgment or decree. 
e. The delay of approximately five years after knowledge of the encumbrance 
and before requesting rescission was unreasonable and allowed market forces to adversely 
affect the value of the subject Property to the prejudice of the plaintiffs. 
f. This Court recognizes the doctrine of prejudice established in the Utah 
Supreme Court case of Jacobson v. Jacobson, 557 P.2d 156 (Utah 1976), cited by the 
Utah Court of Appeals in its Memorandum Decision. This Court believes all the 
elements found to exist in Jacobson are also present in the instant case as more fully 
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described in the Findings of Fact above including the fact that (1) an original seller D. 
C. Anderson, had died and his testimony as to the transaction was no longer available; 
(2) the Rossi Hill Property had a 50% reduction in value during the five years when 
Doms and Domcoy Enterprises, Inc. had the exclusive possession of the property; (3) the 
entire Rossi Hill Property had been conveyed by Doms and McCoy to a third party, to 
wit, Domcoy Enterprises, Inc.; (4) Doms as an equal fifty percent (50%) shareholder in 
Domcoy, received the full benefit of the value of the Rossi Hill Property because his 
shareholding interests would have been increased by the value which the Rossi Hill 
Property contributed to the net worth of Domcoy; and (5) at the time the defendants 
conveyed their interest to Domcoy, the Property was worth as much as it was when they 
purchased the Property from the plaintiffs. 
g. The undivided one-half interest of Michael R. McCoy, a defendant in the 
case, was sold at sheriffs sale so that only a 50% interest in the Property could be 
tendered for rescission. 
h. Doms had the use and benefit of the property to the exclusion of the 
plaintiffs. He purchased the slipper parcel and attempted to formulate a plan for a three-
parcel integrated development, but was unsuccessful. The plaintiffs are now foreclosed 
from developing an integrated development because Doms has an interest in the slipper 
parcel and the likelihood of Doms cooperating with the plaintiffs in an integrated 
development is remote. 
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i. Doms' inexperience in developing property or inability to sell the property 
impacted the plaintiffs greatly because of down turn in the real estate market and the 
increased costs to develop the property if they chose to do so. 
j . Doms should not benefit from his poor decisions at the expense of the 
plaintiffs. To allow that to happen would be inequitable. 
k. Doms was in default; therefore, could not invoke the doctrine of 
rescission. 
3. The other matters referred to in the court of appeals' note 2 are reserved for 
additional hearing and consideration. 
DATED this ,4>/ day of , 1996. 
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ADDENDA #11. 
ADDENDUM 1 1 
JUN 0 4 1997 
LARRY R. KELLER, #1785 
KELLER & LUNDGREN, L.C 
Attorney for Defendant Eugene E. Doms 
257 Towers, Suite 340 
257 East 200 South - 10 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7282 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ELLEN ANDERSON, as Personal, 
Representative of the Estate 
of D.C. ANDERSON, DAN SCOTT, 
ELLEN ANDERSON, personally, 
and JEANNE SCOTT, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
MICHAEL R. MCCOY AND 
EUGENE E. DOMS, 
Defendants. 
ELLEN ANDERSON, as Personal, 
Representative of the Estate 
of D.C. ANDERSON, DAN SCOTT, 
ELLEN ANDERSON, personally, 
and JEANNE SCOTT, 
Third Party Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
SUMMIT COUNTY TITLE COMPANY, 
a Utah corporation, 
Third Party Defendant. 
] 
ORDER ON COURTS 
MINUTE ENTRY OF 
MAY 6, 1997 
Civil No. 8339 
ELLEN ANDERSON, as Personal 
representative of the Estate of 
D.C ANDERSON; DAN SCOTT; and 
PAUL D. VEASY, Trustee, 
Plaintiffe, 
v. 
SUMMIT COUNTY, a body corporate 
and politic of the State of 
Utah; BLAKE L. FRAZIER, in his 
official capacity as Summit 
County Auditor; GUMP & AYERS 
REAL ESTATE, INC, a Utah 
corporation; VICTOR R. AYERS; 
DOMCOY ENTERPRISES, INC, a 
Utah corporation; EUGENE E. 
DOMS; UNKNOWN DEFENDANTS 
DESCRIBED AS JOHN DOES 1, 2, 
3, 4, and 5, 
Defendants, 
Civil No. 10066 
The above-entitled matter came before me, the Honorable John A. Rokich, Senior 
District Court Judge, pursuant to remand from the Utah Court of Appeals requiring 
additional Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law relating to the above-entitled matter-
The Court having reviewed its notes and the memoranda filed by respective 
counsel, concludes that the proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law filed by 
Defendant Doms on March 10, 1997 are adopted by the Court, By the adoption of these 
Facts and Conclusions, which will follow, the Court in its opinion has adequately treated 
the effect of the intervening conveyance to and from Domcoy on Doms* right to pursue 
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his counterclaims and the effect of the Default Judgment entered against McCoy and the 
sheriffs sale of McCoy's interest, if any, in Rossi Hills on Doms' ownership interest in 
the property and any damages for breach of title warranties. 
The Court allowed an additional hearing at which both parties were heard through 
their respective counsel on January 28, 1997. Respective counsel also submitted 
memoranda and proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to the Court. 
Being fully advised of the parties' positions herein, the Court herein makes the 
following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Defendants Doms and McCoy, as tenants in common, conveyed Rossi Hills 
to Domcoy, Inc., a Utah corporation, by warranty deed dated August 20, 1983. 
2. The two corporate officers of Domcoy at that time were McCoy as 
president, and Doms as secretaiy/treasurer, and the directors were Doms and his wife, 
and McCoy and his wife. 
3. In March of 1985, McCoy and his wife irrevocably tendered all their voting 
rights in their shares of Domcoy, Inc. stock to Defendant Doms and resigned from the 
corporation. 
4. Prior to this time, Doms' wife, who was never involved in the business of 
* g/" Domcoy, had also resigned from Domcoy. 
5. Doms became the only officer and director of Domcoy, and still is the only 
officer and director to this date. 
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6. On December 31, 1986, Doms allowed Domcoy to be involuntarily 
dissolved by the Utah Division of Corporations for failure to file annual reports because 
Doms was the only remaining officer and director of Domcoy; and Domcoy, therefore, 
no longer had the minimum number of officers and directors required by Utah law and 
the Certificate of Incorporation of Domcoy. 
7. By August of 1988, when Domcoy deeded Rossi Hills to Doms, Domcoy 
was no longer conducting any business except "winding up" its affairs as a dissolved 
corporation. 
8. As a result of these transactions, Domcoy had no board of directors which 
could adopt a resolution regarding the transfer of Rossi Hills, and Doms was the only 
shareholder entitled to vote because McCoy and his wife had irrevocably tendered their 
voting rights and fheir shares of Domcov stock to Doms in March of 1985. 
9. A sheriffs sale occurred on December 12, 1988, by the Sheriff of Summit 
County and a corrected sheriffs deed bears the date of June 26, 1989, transferring the 
interests of defendant McCoy in the Rossi Hills property to plaintiffe. 
10. At the time of the issuance of the sheriffs deed, defendant McCoy had no 
ownership interest whatsoever in the Rossi Hills property. 
11. Doms and McCoy did not purchase the property as a partnership, and at 
no time did either party hold the property as a partnership. 
12. Plaintiffs have not sued Doms and McCoy in this lawsuit as a partnership, 
and have never obtained or attempted to obtain a Judgment against Doms and McCoy as 
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a partnership. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Despite intervening conveyances between Doms and McCoy to Domcoy, 
the foreclosure upon title to the Rossi Hills property by Summit County, and the 
subsequent reconveyance to Doms by Summit County, Doms presently holds clear title to 
the property and his right to pursue his counterclaim is not affected. 
2. Plaintiffs lack standing to attack the validity of the Warranty Deed 
conveying Rossi Hills from Domcoy to Doms which is a valid deed vesting title to the 
property in Doms. 
3. Doms is prosecuting his Second Amended Counterclaim as the real party 
in interest, because Rossi Hills was never partnership property. 
4. The Default Judgment entered against McCoy and the sheriffs sale of 
McCoy's interest in Rossi Hills has no effect on Doms' ownership interest in the 
property and his ability to collect damages for breach of title warranties, because McCoy 
had no ownership interest in Rossi Hills when the sheriffs sale pursuant to the Default 
Judgment against McCoy was conducted; and plaintiffs, therefore, acquired no ownership 
interest in the property from the sheriffs sale. 
5. Since rescission has been denied by this Court based upon the doctrine of 
laches, Doms still has available to him the remedy of damages based upon plaintiffs' 
breach of the warranty against encumbrances. 
6. This Court now concludes that it has now met the requirements of the 
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decision of the Utah Court of Appeals in remanding this case back to this Court for 
further Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and this Order shall be deemed final 
for purposes of appeal on the date in which it is signed. 
DATED this ff day of 5 i . j P - 1997. 
JOHN A. ROKICH 
SENIOR DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing to be 
mailed, by first class U.S. postage prepaid, this 3lH day of y HMf0, 1997, to: 
Irving H. Biele James A Mcintosh 
Nygaard, Coke & Vincent James A. Mcintosh & Associates 
333 North 300 West 1399 South 700 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84103 Salt Lake City, UT 84105 
^MOn OuMfa 
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ADDENDA #12. 
ADDENDUM 1 2 
IRVING H. BIELE 
JAMES A. MCINTOSH 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
1399 South 700 East, Suite 17 
Salt Lake City, UT 84103 
Telephone: (801)487-7834 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ELLEN ANDERSON, as Personal 
Representative of the Estate of 
D.C.ANDERSON; DAN SCOTT; 
ELLEN ANDERSON, personally; 
and JEANNE SCOTT, 
Plaintiffs, * NOTICE OF OMISSIONS 
vs. 
* 
EUGENE E. DOMS and MICHAEL 
R. McCOY, 
Defendants. 
ELLEN ANDERSON, as Personal * Case No. 8339 
Representative of the Estate of 
D.C.ANDERSON; DAN SCOTT; 
ELLEN ANDERSON, personally; 
and JEANNE SCOTT, 
Third-Party Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
SUMMIT COUNTY TITLE COMPANY, 
a Utah corporation, * 
Third-Party Defendant. * 
ELLEN ANDERSON, as Personal 
Representative of the Estate of 
D.C.ANDERSON; DAN SCOTT; 
and PAUL D. VEASY, Trustee, 
Case No. 10066 
Plaintiffs, 
COPY 
vs. * 
SUMMIT COUNTY, a body corporate * 
and politic of the State of Utah; BLAKE 
L. FRAZIER, in his official capacity as * 
Summit County Auditor; GUMP & 
AYERS REAL ESTATE, INC., a Utah * 
corporation; VICTOR R. AYERS; DOM-
COY ENTERPRISES, INC., a Utah * 
corporation; EUGENE E. DOMS; and 
Unknown Defendants described as * 
JOHN DOES 1,2, 3, 4 and 5, 
Defendants. 
The Court furnished plaintiffs with a Minute Entry dated May 6, and mailed May 
7, 1997. This Minute Entry was apparently in response to Footnote 2 of the Utah Court 
of Appeals Memorandum Decision, issued in this case under date of November 4, 1994, 
wherein the Court of Appeals, in Footnote 2, stated: 
"However, in the event the trial court does not rescind the transaction, the 
trial court should note that its findings and conclusions do not adequately 
treat the effect of the intervening conveyances to and from Domcoy or 
Doms' right to pursue his counterclaim and the effect of the default 
judgment entered against McCoy and the sheriffs sale of McCoy's interest 
in Rossi Hills or Doms1 ownership interest in the property and any 
damages for breach of title warranties." 
POINT 1 
The important portion is the requirement that the court ". . . adequately treat the 
effect of the intervening conveyances to and from Domcoy or Doms' right to pursue his 
counterclaims. . ." 
The intervening conveyances are: 
1. The Trust Deed executed by both Mr. Doms and Mr. McCoy and securing 
the payment of the promissory note which is being foreclosed in this 
action. Comment: In order to assess the effect of the sheriffs sale of 
McCoy's interest, as required by Footnote 2, it is necessary to show that 
Mr. McCoy encumbered his interest and the effect of such encumbrance 
in its relation to subsequent transfers. 
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2. The Warranty Deed from Mr. Doms and Mr. McCoy to Domcoy Enter-
prises, Inc., a corporation. Since Mr. Doms and Mr. McCoy received full 
consideration for the transfer by the increase of a value of their interest in 
Domcoy Enterprises, Inc., would this not prohibit Mr. Doms or Mr. McCoy 
from claiming any additional consideration from the plaintiffs, since Doms 
and McCoy were both sellers and their corporation was the buyer, and 
they knew of the existence of the easements? The corporation has made 
no demands against Mr. Doms or Mr. McCoy so they have not been 
damaged, and obviously the statute of limitations has expired in relation to 
any claim the corporation may have against them. 
3. The Deed from Domcoy Enterprises, Inc., the corporation, to Mr. Doms as 
an individual. Comment: This intervening conveyance is very question-
able as the directors had not authorized the transaction. There is no 
evidence as to the resignation of the directors and in fact there was a 
stockholders' meeting subsequent to the transfer of the voting rights that 
recognized the directors and stockholders. 
The court must also determine whether the covenant against encumbrances runs 
with the land and therefore entitles a subsequent grantee of the right to sue an original 
grantor that is removed by several conveyances. 
POINT II 
There is no discussion as to the right to foreclose the trustee as a mortgage and 
the activity in relation thereto, or the fact that each transaction subsequent to the 
creation of the trust deed would transfer the property subject to the trust deed and the 
ownership of Mr. McCoy in the property. 
There is no evidence that Mr. Doms or Mr. McCoy suffered damages by reason 
of the transfer to Domcoy Enterprises, Inc. Therefore, it is necessary for the court to 
make a determination as to whether the covenant against encumbrances runs with the 
land and would favor Mr. Doms as the owner of the entire fee as a result of the transfer 
from Domcoy to Mr. Doms, or only on the divided one-half interest. There is also no 
evidence as to damage as a result of the sale to Domcoy Enterprises, Inc. 
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WHEREFORE, the plaintiffs request that the court make such appropriate 
findings as are necessary to comply with the judgment of the Court of Appeals; further, 
to determine damages and whether Mr. Doms as a subsequent grantee is entitled to the 
full measure of damages, or only to one-half of any purported damages, that may have 
arisen by reason of the deed from plaintiffs to Mr. Doms and Mr. McCoy; and further, for 
such other and further relief as seems appropriate to the court in relation to the opinion 
of the Court of Appeals. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this day of May, 1997. 
IRVING H. BIELE 
JAMES A. MCINTOSH 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing NOTICE 
OF OMISSIONS was mailed, postage prepaid, this day of May, 1997, to the 
following: 
LARRY R. KELLER 
Attorney for Defendant 
257 East 200 South-10, Suite 340 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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ADDENDA #13. 
ADDENDUM 1 3 
IRVING H. BIELE, USB #A0317 
NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT 
333 North 300 West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
Telephone: (801) 328-2506 
JAMES A McINTOSH, USB #2194 
JAMES A. McINTOSH & ASSOCIATES P.C. 
1399 South 700 East, Suite 17, Intrade Bldg. South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105 
Telephone: (801) 487-7834 
Co-Counsel for Plaintiffs 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR 
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ELLEN ANDERSON, as Personal 
Representative of the Estate of 
D. C. Anderson, DAN SCOTT, ; 
ELLEN ANDERSON, personally, ; 
and JEANNE SCOTT, ; 
Plaintiffs, ; 
vs. ] 
EUGENE E. POMS and ] 
MICHAEL R. McCOY, ] 
Defendants. ] 
) OTHER ISSUES THAT MAY ARISE BY 
) REASON OF FOOTNOTE TWO OF 
) COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION AND 
) OTHER REQUIREMENTS OF THESE 
) POST APPEAL HEARINGS 
i Case No. 8339 
1 Judge John A. Rokich 
Other issues that may arise by reason of Footnote Two of the Court of Appeals' Decision 
are as follows: 
1 
1. The question as to whether setoff is an appropriate method of handling damages 
if any are awarded. 
2. The methodology for the sale of the one-half interest of Mr. Doms which is being 
foreclosed as a mortgage. 
3. Correction of the judgment which at present quiets title in Mr. Doms. 
4. Elimination in the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of the reference to 
McHenry's Avenue as it was never involved in the sale of the property. 
5. The total amount of the judgment against Mr. Doms that is in favor of the Estate 
of D. C. Anderson. 
6. The matter of attorney fees is also at issue as substantial fees have been incurred 
in supporting or establishing the basis for rescission and in other matters relating to plaintiffs' 
position in this case. Undoubtedly, the Court will want either affidavits or a hearing in relation 
to this matter. 
7. Does the review by the trial court of the facts and issues raise new questions as 
to the Statute of Limitations. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 7th day of February, 1997. 
NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT 
Irvi 
Counsel for Plaintiffs 
* 
? 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
)SS: 
County of Salt Lake ) 
ALICE ANDERSEN, being first duly sworn, says: 
That she Is employed in the offices of Nygaard, Coke St Vincent, attorneys for the 
plaintiffs herein; that she served the attached Other Issues that May Arise by Reason of 
Footnote Two of Court of Appeals7 Decision and Other Requirements of These Post Appeal 
Hearings upon the following by placing a true and correa copy thereof in an envelope 
addressed to: 
Larry H. Keller, Esq. 
KELLER SC LUNDGREN, L.C 
Attorney for Defendant Eugene E. Doms 
257 Towers, Suite 340 
257 East 200 South 0 10 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
and depositing the same, sealed, with first-class postage thereon prepaid, in the United States 
Mail at Salt Lake City, Utah, on the 7th day of February, 1997. 
LAJLLAJ. (JUAj<yLu*Ji<*y 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 7th day of February, 1997 
Notary Public 
Residing at Salt Lake City, UT 
My Commission Expires: 
Notary Public • 
CAROLYN S COOKSEY | 
333 North 300 West i 
Salt Lake City, Utah 64103 I 
My Commission PXDTCS • 
JLT>3 2 2 , i:id I 
f^3^^2 | 
ADDENDA #14. 
Anderson & Scott v* Doms & McCoy 
Oct.-Nov. 1981 
Doms inspected 
I and had actual notice 
of encumbrances 
(Findings of fact #33, 
34, 41, 42 and 43). 
March 23,1985 
Three-year 
Statute of 
Limitations 
on Fraud 
Claim expired. 
Jan. 29,1988 
Jan. 21,1988 Answer and 
Default counterclaim 
Judgments for recession 
Aug. 20,1983 
Doms & McCoy 
Warranty Deed to 
Domcoy Enterprises 
Inc. Exhibit 16. 
March 23,1986 
Four-year 
Statute of 
Limitations 
on Recession 
expired. 
entered, filed but not March 23,1986 the Answer & Counter 
/ O ' J'ftf I'&'J'M I'W. I'86 \'l!V I 
effective as Six-year 
judgment is Statute of 
in effect 
(R 41-44). 
Limitations 
on Contract 
June 1, 1988 
Doms files certificate 
of compliance agreeing 
that the effective date 
for the acceptance of 
claim is June 1, 1988 
(R-76-78 Addendum 21 
to brief). 
June 15,1988 
I Ammended Answer and 
I Counterclaim (Requested only 
I Rescission and Lost Profits). 
HW 1983 
D.C Anderson 
Estate probated 
and no claim 
filed (R007988). 
May 27,1987 
Tax sale deed 
to Summit 
County Exhibit 5 
in consolidated 
March 22,1982 
Sale closed. Deed 
recorded. Trust 
deed delivered 
(Exhibits 1, 2-69). 
June 6,1985 
Mr Anderson 
and Mr. Scott 
file complaint 
to foreclose 
Trust Deed 
as mortgage. 
case #10066. 
1
 July 5,1988 
Court signed order authorizing joinder 
of Mrs. Anderson and Mrs. Scott 
as voluntary plaintiffs. 
Order authorizing filing of Second 
Amended Counter and the filing thereof. 
• 1st Claim. Rescission (citing Bergstrom Moore) 
conditioned on tender of property to plaintiffs. 
• 2nd Claim. Lost Profits (Doms abandoned this 
claim (R-79 27-30). 
• 3rd Claim. Fraud (Doms consented to dismissal 
of this claim (R-7763-64) and waived any right to 
consequential damages. (R-7971) or damages that 
arise by reason of "Special" being placed on deed. 
Aug. 20,1988 
Doms Received 
deed from Domcoy 
(First time he 
obtains title) 
-(Exhibits 1 i & 66). 
ADDENDA #15. 
ADDENDUM 1 5 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
78-12-23(2) An action may be brought within six (6) years. . . (2) Upon any contractual 
obligation or liability founded on an instrument in writing . . . 
57-1-34. The trustee's sale of property under a trust deed shall be made, or an action to 
foreclose a trust deed as provided by law for the foreclosure of mortgages on real property 
shall be commenced, within the period prescribed by law for the commencement of an 
action on the obligation secured by the trust deed. 
Rule 15 (c). Amended and supplemental pleadings.... (c) Relation back of amendments. 
Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, 
transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleadings, 
the amendment relates back to the date of this original pleading. 
